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AGE MATTERS: CLASS, FAMILY FORMATION,
AND INEQUALITY
June Carbone*
Age matters. It matters legally-in giving consent for a
contract, a marriage or enlistment in the armed forces. It
matters practically-for renting a car, securing favorable
insurance rates, and choosing a date. It certainly matters
biologically-we are on the cusp of understating the age-
related changes in emotion and cognition. And, I will argue
in this article, it matters socially. Age, because of the
interaction of physical changes with social structures, may be
an important component of inequality.
This article will begin with a conundrum. The age of
legal majority, that is, of presumed independence, has long
been eighteen, rising to twenty-one for riskier activities such
as the consumption of alcohol. Moreover, the age of legal
maturity, whether eighteen or twenty-one, corresponds to the
point where young adults have often made the transition
from parental guidance to the assumption of adult
responsibilities. Yet, new biological research suggests that
the full age of cognitive maturity, that is, the point where
patterns indicate fully developed adult reasoning and
judgment may not occur until the mid-twenties.
These findings help explain the risk-taking that often
accompanies early adulthood. They vindicate insurance
findings that older drivers, i.e., those over twenty-five, are
better safety risks. They correspond to the criminological
literature that finds that criminal behavior peaks in late
adolescence. They also parallel observations that marriage
after twenty-five produces fewer divorces-and fewer
children. Moreover, this new research is coming on-line at
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the same time as an important transformation of the entry
into adulthood.
Marriage and parenthood once served as important
markers of the assumption of adult roles. Women went from
their parents' home to their husband's, often closely
supervised in each. For men, the pathways could be more
varied. In some societies, financial readiness was
indispensable to the ability to marry; in others, marriage
precipitated entry into the labor force. In both cases, though,
family formation depended on the transition to adulthood.1
Social support, supervision, and in many cases coercion,
shepherded the transition, assisting fragile families in
acquiring stable foundations, and helping them navigate the
difficult early years that preceded full adult maturity.
The new family model, what I have called elsewhere, "the
new middle class morality," postpones marriage and
childbearing until well after entry into adulthood, and does so
for both men and women. In a striking study, Sara
McLanahan reports that between 1970 and 2000, the average
age of first birth for the upper quarter of American women
rose from twenty-six to thirty-two.2 It remained the same for
everyone else. For that upper quartile, which corresponds to
the college educated portion of the population, non-marital
birth rates are below 10%, divorce rates have fallen back to
the levels of the sixties, paternal involvement in childrearing
has doubled, and maternal workforce participation has
become the norm. For this new elite, the picture of family
life is a rosy one-two active parents with more income and
time to invest in their children.
For the rest of the country, family life is a marker of
inequality. McLanahan, comparing the bottom quartile to the
top quartile, finds that for the bottom group, non-marital
birth rates are close to 50%, divorce rates have reached a
1. Late-age marriages, though rare, are not unprecedented. Seventeenth-
century England was remarkable for the relatively late ages of marriage of both
men and women, and the high percentage of people who did not marry at all.
Producing such results, however, required a high degree of supervision of young
adults and intense socialization into appropriate norms and roles. For a more
comprehensive account, see LAWRENCE STONE, THE FAMILY, SEX AND
MARRIAGE IN ENGLAND 1500-1800, at 401-02, 408 (1979).
2. Sara McLanahan, Diverging Destinies: How Children are Faring After
the Second Demographic Transformation, 41 DEMOGRAPHY 607, 609 (2004).
3. Id. at 608-14 figs.1, 2, 3, 4 & 5.
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plateau at historically high levels double that of the top
group, fewer mothers are in the labor market, and fewer
fathers spend time with their children.4
I will argue in this article that age-and the failure of
law and social policy to take age of family formation into
account-is an important factor in the growing family-based
inequality. The secret to the stable marriages of the middle
class is family formation after emotional maturity and
financial independence. The supervised and subsidized
pathway to adulthood occurs before family formation through
education, assistance in achieving the right financial footing,
and internalization of values that promote autonomy and
responsibility. The deregulation of intimate relationships
and tolerance for varied family forms builds on the
construction of a stable foundation, permitting the realization
of traditional family values with a minimum of external
coercion. The ability to avoid early or unplanned childbearing
is critical to the result.
The new model then doubly disadvantages the poor.
They disproportionately lack access to the new, approved
pathways to adulthood that postpone childrearing, and
include post-secondary education, subsidized internships,
contraception, and (if necessary) abortion.' At the same time,
the societal structure and support that guided more
traditional family formation (e.g., high school romances and
unintended pregnancies that lead to early marriage) have
atrophied. Indeed, given the tensions inherent in the
transition to new normative understandings underlying the
change, all of the choices realistically available to the poorest
Americans may incur moral condemnation.7  The result
4. Id.
5. See discussion infra Parts II.C, III.B, III.C.
6. To the extent young marriages endured, they have historically done so
because the resulting family was embedded in a social and cultural milieu that
guided the assumption of adult roles within the structure provided by marriage.
These roles included male employment, driven by families' dependence on the
resulting income, and female socialization into childrearing, with the low point
in women's bargaining power coming with the presence of young children in the
household. For an in-depth examination of these forces, see JUNE CARBONE,
FROM PARTNERS TO PARENTS: THE SECOND REVOLUTION IN FAMILY LAW 123-29
(2000).
7. As I will explain below, neither marriage to an impecunious (if not
violent or criminal) mate, nor a non-marital birth, nor abortion, is likely to
command consensus support as a solution to a poor woman's improvident
2008] 903
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makes family-and the corresponding factor of age-a locus
for exacerbating inequality.
This article will examine the emergence of these class-
based differences through the lens of the new biological
studies on brain maturity. Accordingly, it will begin with a
section that summarizes the research results suggesting that
decision-making after the mid-twenties may be qualitatively
different from the decisions of those in their teens and early
twenties.' Second, it will link the new research on brain
development to class-based changes in family formation.
Third, it will consider the societal support for the different
family models by examining the fight over welfare reform, the
changing picture of accessibility to contraception and
abortion, the workplace support for parents, and the often
hidden class subtext of debates over family values. It will
conclude by sketching the implications for a legal research
agenda attentive to the implications of age and class.
While all of the legal and policy analysis in this paper
could be made without reference to neuroscience or brain
development, I believe that examining these issues in light of
the intersection of age and class adds a new dimension to the
institutional changes exacerbating inequality.
I. 25: THE NEW AGE OF MATURITY?
If eighteen and twenty-one have long been the legal ages
of majority, what are the biological and social markers of
adulthood? The two need not coincide, and indeed need not
be uniform historically or culturally.
Research, for example, on risk-taking, mortality, and
pregnancy. In Congress, the language of welfare reform was the language of
marriage with its corresponding condemnation of non-marital births. For the
proponents of the new middle class morality, however, the problem was not the
birth outside of marriage, but the birth in improvident circumstances at all.
The solution for the latter would, of course, have been more-effective access to
contraception and abortion at a time when the marriage promotion efforts were
counseling abstinence, denying public funding for abortion, and making access
more difficult. See an extended discussion of these issues infra Part II.B.
8. This research first received legal attention in the context of the juvenile
death penalty, and it has been the subject of insightful analysis about teen
decision-making by Jennifer Drobac. See Jennifer Ann Drobac, "Developing
Capacity": Adolescent "Consent" at Work, at Law, and in the Sciences of the
Mind, 10 UC DAVIS J. JUV. L. & POL'Y 1 (2006). This article, however, will focus
not on individual competence in decision-making, but rather institutional
support for the transition to adulthood.
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other behavior often groups the ages from ten to twenty-four
as a focus of inquiry.9 The census subdivides those years into
ten to nineteen as adolescents, and fifteen to twenty-four as
youth. 10 When researchers ask the question, however, what
signifies the entry into adulthood, young Americans are
inclined to reject both chronological age, and the assumption
of adult roles such as full time employment or marriage.
Instead, they choose individual factors as the top three
criteria: accepting responsibility for oneself, making
independent decisions, and becoming financially
independent." The first two involve not just experience, but
capacity, and the development of that capacity has been the
subject of increasing scientific research.
This examination of neuroscience brain development
focuses on the development of the prefrontal cortex, the
center for advanced cognitive reasoning, and recognition that
the brain may not reach full adult development until the mid-
twenties. Cognitive neuroscientists, in particular, have
attempted "to link cognitive processes, such as memory,
attention and decision-making, with activity in the brain." 2
These efforts examine the development of brain structure and
operation. While they are still a long way from charting the
precise relationships between brain developments and
judgment, neuroscientists have established that, contrary to
earlier belief that the brain changed little after early
childhood, brain structure and function continue to change
9. See, e.g., Staci A. Gruber & Deborah A. Yurgelun-Todd, Neurobiology
and the Law: A Role in Juvenile Justice?, 3 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 321, 322 (2006);
Ctrs. for Disease Control and Prevention, Mortality Trends and Leading Causes
of Death Among Adolescents and Young Adults -- United States, 1979-1988, 42
MORBIDITY AND MORTALITY WEEKLY REP. 459, 459 (1993), available at
http://cdc.gov/mmwr/pdflwk/mm4224.pdf.
10. See Peter Xenos, Events Information and the Life Course Framework in
Young Adult Reproductive Health (YARH) Survey Studies of Adolescent Risk 3
(East-West Ctr., Working Paper No. 108-1, 2001), available at
http://www2.eastwestcenter.org/ayarr200l/Previews/Eventslnfo/108-01.pdf.
11. Jeffrey Jensen Arnett & Nancy L. Galambos, Culture and Conceptions of
Adulthood, in Exploring Cultural Conceptions of the Transition to Adulthood,
100 NEW DIRECTIONS FOR CHILD AND ADOLESCENT DEVELOPMENT 91, 91-92
(Jeffrey Jensen Arnett & Nancy L. Galambos eds., 2003).
12. Catherine Sebastian, The Second Decade: What Can We Do About the
Adolescent Brain? 1 OPTICON1826 1 (2007),
http://www.ucl.ac.uk/cics/opticon1826/VolumelIssue2/
TableOfContentsNfPLIFETeenagers.pdf.
20081 905
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into the twenties. 13
A. Brain Structure: The Ratio of White Matter to Gray
Matter
The brain consists of about 100 billion nerve cells.14 The
cell bodies comprise the brain's "gray matter." 5 Protrusions
from cell bodies, known as "axons" and "dendrites,"
interconnect the neurons. A fatty substance called "myelin,"
which acts as an insulator, coats the axons, allowing the more
efficient transmission of electrical signals. These insulated
fibers bind together to form the brain's "white matter."6 Staci
Gruber and Deborah Yurgelun-Todd explain that "white
matter can be understood as the parts of the brain
responsible for information transmission, whereas gray
matter is responsible for information processing."17
While the volume of white matter in the brain increases
linearly and continues to increase into midlife, gray matter
expands significantly in early adolescence and is then pruned
back during post-adolescence. 8  "Pruning" involves the
thinning of gray matter, eliminating the excess connections
between brain cells. The specific form the pruning takes
reflects experience; the neuronal process becomes more
efficient at the tasks to which the brain has become
13. Id. at 1. Elizabeth S. Scott & Laurence Steinberg, Essay, Blaming
Youth, 81 TEX. L. REV. 799, 811-13 (2003), suggest that adolescents may have
the cognitive capacity for adult decision-making, but lack the skill and
experience necessary for reliable judgments in stressful situations. The
assertion relies not on neuroscience findings, but on small scale laboratory
experiments largely involving middle-class students that test cognitive
judgment. They further agree, on the basis of psychological research, that
psychosocial development proceeds more slowly than cognitive ability, id. at
813, and that a stable sense of identity does not emerge until early adulthood.
Id. at 812.
14. Sebastian, supra note 12, at 1.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Gruber & Yurgelun-Todd, supra note 9, at 324.
18. Craig M. Bennett & Abigail A. Baird, Anatomical Changes in the
Emerging Adult Brain: A Voxel-Based Morphometry Study, 27 HUM. BRAIN
MAPPING 766, 767 (2005), available at http'//www3.interscience.wiley.com/cgi-
bin/fulltext1112162278/ABSTRACT. Gray matter also increases dramatically
during late fetal development and after birth, and is pruned back starting
around the age of two. Paul Arshagouni, "But I'm an Adult Now... Sort of:"
Adolescent Consent in Health Care Decision-Making and the Adolescent Brain, 9
J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL'Y 315, 347-48 (2006).
906 [Vo1:48
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accustomed to performing.1 9 "Myelination," or the increased
coating of axons with white matter, further improves
transmission, making the connections quicker and more
reliable.2" Researchers hypothesize that reductions in gray
matter reflect increased myelination, which in turn produce
age-related improvements in cognitive processing.2' Gruber
and Yurgelun-Todd accordingly posit that the ratio of white-
to-gray matter volume corresponds with brain maturation.22
Studies of brain development show that brain volume,
which reflects the combination of white and gray matter,
continues to increase until around age twenty, and that the
ratio of white to gray matter continues to change at least into
the mid-twenties, with later development for males than
females.23  Moreover, this research indicates that the
development of different parts of the brain occurs at different
times. The last parts of the brain to mature are the frontal
lobes, regions of the brain associated with planning,
attention, and social interactions.24
19. See Inside the Teenage Brain, Interview on Frontline with Jay Giedd,
Neuroscientist, Nat'l Inst. of Mental Health, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/
frontline/shows/teenbrainlinterviews/giedd.html (last visited Mar. 17, 2008).
20. See MICHAEL S. GAZZANIGA, RICHARD B. IVRY & GEORGE R. MANGUN,
COGNITIVE NEUROSCIENCE: THE BIOLOGY OF THE MIND 27-28, 41-42 (1998).
21. Gruber & Yurgelun-Todd, supra note 9, at 324.
22. Id. at 325.
23. Lucy C. Ferguson, Comment, The Implications of Developmental
Cognitive Research on "Evolving Standards of Decency" and the Imposition of
the Death Penalty on Juveniles, 54 AM. U. L. REV. 441, 454 (2004); see also
Sebastian, supra note 12, at 1 ("[Bloth white and grey matter continue to
develop well into our twenties."); Bennett & Baird, supra note 18, at 2 (noting
that MRI studies show that white matter continues to increase into mid-life,
while gray matter peaks in early adolescence and declines into early adulthood);
Gruber & Yurgelun-Todd, supra note 9, at 325 (discussing that greater volume
of white matter and reduced gray matter correlates with more efficient and
rapid information processing and verbal ability typical of adult maturation).
Gray matter, however, peaks in volume at the beginning of adolescence.
Arshagouni, supra note 18, at 348. The relationship between white/gray matter
development and sex differences in maturation is not well understood, however.
See, e.g., Michael D. De Bellis et al., Sex Differences in Brain Maturation During
Childhood and Adolescence, 11 CEREBRAL CORTEX 552 (2001). Men and women
vary significantly in the ratio between white matter and gray matter, and men
experience more dramatic changes than women during adolescence and early
adulthood. Researchers speculate that the differences are attributable to sex-
based hormonal differences, which begin earlier in women because of the earlier
average age of puberty. Id. at 555.
24. See Sebastian, supra note 12, at 1. Cf Bennett and Baird, supra note 18,
at 767 ("Spatially, the dorsal, medial, and lateral areas of prefrontal cortex and
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B. Brain Function: The Pre-frontal Cortex, Brain Integration,
and Judgment
While scientists cannot yet link the structural changes in
the brain to specific behavior, they emphasize that the last
regions to develop control the most sophisticated brain
processes.25  Furthermore, the most profound differences
between adult and adolescent behavior involve decision-
making, or executive level processing.26 Catherine Sebastian
observes, for example, that teenagers and adults both perform
the complex visual calculation necessary to determine when a
car will enter an intersection in similar ways.27 They are
more likely to differ, however, in how they reach a decision
about whether to attempt to beat the approaching car into the
intersection or to wait.28
Such judgments involve not just overall brain volume,
but also the relationships among different parts of the brain.
Positron Emission Tomography, or PET scans, measure
baseline glucose metabolism in different parts of the brain.
These PET scan studies show that cortical metabolic activity
reaches stable, adult-like activity only in the mid-twenties.29
More recent studies indicate that the cerebellum develops
almost as late as the frontal cortex,3° and that it is involved in
any skill involving higher thought, including music,
mathematics, philosophy, and decision-making.3
posterior areas of temporal cortex have been shown to develop last."). See also
Gruber & Yurgelun-Todd, supra note 9, at 324 (stating that the largest
maturational changes observed between twelve and sixteen and twenty-three
and thirty occurred in certain regions of the frontal lobes). Sebastian, unlike
the others, also emphasizes changes in the parietal lobes, but those changes
tend to be complete by mid-adolescence. Arshagouni, supra note 18, at 349.
25. Sebastian, supra note 12, at 2; see also Cass R. Sunstein, Adolescent
Risk Taking and Social Meaning: A Commentary 2-4 (John M. Olin Law &
Econ. Working Paper No. 386, 2d Series, 2008), available at
http://www.law.uchicago.edu/Lawecon/index.html (synthesizing different
commentaries on brain maturation, but noting later development of the areas of
the brain associated with mature judgment).
26. Sebastian, supra note 12, at 2.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Bennett & Baird, supra note 18 (citing P. Van Bogaert et al., Regional
Changes in Glucose Metabolism During Brain Development from the Age of 6
Years, 8 NEUROIMAGE 62 (1998)).
30. Arshagouni, supra note 18, at 349 (finding that the cerebellum does not
reach full development until the early twenties).
31. Id.
908 [Vol:48
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Nonetheless, the most dramatic studies involve the prefrontal
cortex. This research emphasizes not just that the area of the
brain associated with reason and judgment develops later
than the rest of the brain, but that the pathways between the
pre-frontal cortex and the emotional centers of the brain
develop later still.32 What was once thought to be a bright-
line distinction between reason and emotion is rapidly
dissolving.
Abigail Baird emphasizes that reason does not in fact
work very well in the absence of emotion, and reason in turn
makes the emotional parts of the brain more accurate.3 3 An
early study, for example, showed adult and adolescent
subjects fearful faces and asked them to identify the
emotions. The adults displayed significant activation of the
prefrontal cortex in performing the task, while the
adolescents showed no activation in that region. Conversely,
the teenagers responded with greater activation of the
amygdala than did the adults, suggesting that, for adults, the
activity in the pre-frontal cortex may have suppressed the
response of the amygdala.34 Further, studies show similar
results with "happy faces:" this time indicating a correlation
between age and the anterior cingulate in performing the
activity.3 The anterior cingulate is involved in decision-
making, evaluation of outcomes, and inhibition, and both of
these studies indicate that, among the adolescents, the
activity levels in the prefrontal cortex increased with age.36
A further study in this series demonstrated that the use
of different parts of the brain affected overall accuracy.
Shown a series of facial expressions, the adults correctly
identified fear every time while the teens did so only about
50% of the time. Accurate responses corresponded with
activation of the pre-frontal cortex, while the less accurate
respondents relied more on use of the amygdala. 37
Researchers believe that greater reliance on the amygdala
32. Bennett & Baird, supra note 18, at 9.
33. Abigail A. Baird, Adolescent Moral Reasoning: The Integration of
Emotion and Cognition, MORAL PSYCHOL. (forthcoming), available at
http://theteenbrain.com/aboutl publications/pdfs/2006-Baird-Morality.pdf (last
visited Apr. 2, 2008).
34. Gruber & Yurgelun-Todd, supra note 9, at 328.
35. Id. at 328-29.
36. Id.
37. Arshagouni, supra note 18, at 350.
20081 909
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corresponds to more emotional, erratic, and impulsive
decision-making." It may also explain teens' greater
difficulty in interpreting emotional signals. 9
Other work examines the ventromedial pre-frontal
cortex, which is thought to be involved in the evaluation of
rewards. The Iowa Gambling Test considers the role of this
part of the brain by giving subjects four decks of cards. Two
decks offer the possibility of high rewards and heavy losses.
The other two decks offer smaller rewards and losses. The
decks are stacked so that the two decks offering smaller
rewards and losses produce the greatest gains. 40  Normal
adults, after trying all four decks, gradually shift to the decks
producing the greatest yields. 41 Adults with damage to the
ventromedial PFC do not.42 When a group ranging in age
from six to twenty-five performed the task, all but the
youngest gradually shifted to the "good decks," but those in
their early teens, i.e., from ten to fifteen, took the longest to
do S0.
4 3
These studies involve different areas of the brain that
may come on-line at different points in the transition from
adolescence to adulthood.' They are part of increasing
efforts to map higher level executive functioning, the ability
to suppress impulsive or risky behavior,45 the influence of
38. Id.
39. Ferguson, supra note 23, at 455 n.75.
40. Sebastian, supra note 12, at 2.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Eveline A. Crone & Maurits W. Van der Molen, Developmental Changes
in Real Life Decision Making: Performance on a Gambling Task Previously
Shown to Depend on the Ventromedial Prefrontal Cortex, 25 DEVELOPMENTAL
NEUROPSYCHOL. 251, 252-53 (2004).
44. The Iowa Gambling Task, for example, identified major differences
between ten- to fifteen-year-olds and older teens, while the face recognition
exercise showed more continuous changes into the twenties. Given the small
sample sizes in most of these studies, it is difficult to tell whether the changes
reflect a continuous developmental process that levels off in the twenties or a
lumpier process of jumps in different parts of brain development at different
times. See Sebastian, supra note 12, at 2.
45. A simple study that asked adolescents to inhibit a natural response
(pushing a button unless an X appeared) found that the adolescents, who
performed with the same accuracy as adults, activated more of the prefrontal
cortex to accomplish the same task as the adults. This suggests that
adolescents find it either more difficult or less efficient to inhibit the response.
Leanne Tamm, Vinod Menon & Allan L. Reiss, Maturation of Brain Function
Associated with Response Inhibition, 41 J. AM. ACAD. OF CHILD AND
910 [Vol:48
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peers,4 6 the accuracy of social judgments, 47 and the ability to
plan and evaluate options. One of the more comprehensive
studies examined college students over the age of eighteen
and found continuing development in five different brain
regions associated with conscious awareness of emotion, the
integration of sensory information into higher order
processes, and formulation of strategies. 8 Dr. Baird, one of
the study's authors, concludes: "One striking difference
regarding the development of the prefrontal cortex relative to
other cortical areas is the continuation of synaptic pruning
into young adulthood. This decrease in synaptic density
during adolescence coincides with the emergence of newly
entwined cognitive and emotional phenomena." 49 She agrees
with Dr. Ruben Gur, Director of the University of
Pennsylvania Medical Center, that strong and growing
evidence shows that the brain continues to mature into the
early twenties "in those relevant parts that govern
impulsivity, judgment, planning for the future, foresight of
consequences, and other characteristics."5
C. Psycho-Social Development and The Maturation of
Judgment
Law professor Elizabeth Scott and psychologist Laurence
Steinberg, in examining juvenile crime and behavior,
ADOLESCENT PSYCHIATRY 1231, 1231-33 (2002).
46. See, e.g., Margo Gardner & Laurence Steinberg, Peer Influence on Risk
Taking, Risk Preference, and Risky Decision-Making in Adolescence and
Adulthood: An Experimental Study, 41 DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOL. 625, 629
(2005) (finding in a driving simulation study that teens took more risks when
driving with peers than when driving alone).
47. One study, for example, asked adults and adolescents to make decisions
about physical causality (e.g., consequences of a storm) versus intentional
causality (what a person might choose to do). Sarah-Jayne Blakemore et al.,
Adolescent Development of the Neural Circuitry for Thinking about Intentions, 2
SOC. COGNITIVE AND AFFECTIVE NEUROSCI. 130, 131 (2007). When asked to
think about intentional causality, the teens activated a larger portion of their
medial PFCs than did the adults, while the adults activated a different brain
area. Id. at 133. Sebastian speculates that the differences reflect the adults'
greater maturity and efficiency in making social judgments. Sebastian, supra
note 12, at 3.
48. Bennett & Baird, supra note 18, at 9.
49. Baird, supra note 33, at 5.
50. Arshagouni, supra note 18, at 351 (quoting Am. Bar Ass'n Juvenile
Justice Ctr., Adolescence, Brain Development, and Legal Culpability, CRUEL
AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT: THE JUVENILE DEATH PENALTY 3 (2004).
20081
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distinguish between "cognitive" capacity and "psycho-social"
development. 51  Their research draws on more traditional
psychological studies rather than on developments in
neuroscience, but their insights parallel the newer findings
on brain development. 2 Indeed, Scott and Steinberg draw
virtually the same distinctions that Sebastian did in
summarizing neuroscience findings above.53 They observe
that by mid-adolescence teens resemble adults in their
cognitive capacity; that is, their ability to learn through
education and experience, their information-processing skills,
such as attention, short- and long-term memory, and
organization, and their overall ability to understand and
reason.54 They would agree that teens enjoy nearly the same
capacity as adults to learn to calculate the speed and
trajectory of a car approaching an intersection. What
develops more slowly than cognitive ability is "psycho-social"
development; that is, the contextual judgment to determine
whether it is worth the risk to attempt to enter the
intersection before the approaching car. That judgment may
involve weighing the small chance of an accident against
long-term catastrophic consequences, the reaction of peers
present in the car versus the impact on loved ones who are
not physically present, and experience-those who drive
regularly or have witnessed an accident may respond
differently from those who have not.55
51. Scott & Steinberg, supra note 13, at 812-13.
52. Id. at 816.
53. See Gruber & Yurgelun-Todd, supra note 9, at 324.
54. Scott & Steinberg, supra note 13, at 812; see also id. at n.54 (stating that
"the key advances during this period are gains in deductive reasoning, the
ability to think about hypothetical situations, the ability to think
simultaneously in multiple dimensions, the ability to think abstractly, and the
ability to think about the process of thinking ('metacognition')"); see also JOHN
H. FLAVELL, PATRICIA H. MILLER & SCOTr A. MILLER, COGNITIVE
DEVELOPMENT (Prentice Hall 1993) (1963) (outlining Piaget's theory and
updating it based on new data); BARBEL INHELDER & JEAN PIAGET, THE
GROWTH OF LOGICAL THINKING FROM CHILDHOOD TO ADOLESCENCE (Ann
Parsons & Stanley Milgram trans., 1958); JEAN PIAGET, GENETIC
EPISTEMOLOGY (Eleanor Duckworth trans., 1970); ROBERT S. SIEGLER,
CHILDREN'S THINKING (Prentice-Hall 1991) (1986).
55. Sunstein, supra note 25, at 8 (explaining the role of experience in
making judgments both faster and more accurate). Experience, of course, can
make individuals overly cautious. Someone who has experienced an accident
may have a strong association between the decision to enter an intersection and
a visceral sense of fear that may interfere with efficient decision-making.
912 [Vo1:48
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Scott and Sternberg emphasize four factors critical to
mature judgment that continue to change into early
adulthood: peer orientation, attitudes toward and perception
of risk, temporal perspective, and capacity for self-
management. 6 While researchers have yet to chart the exact
relationship between brain function and decision-making,
these factors are associated with the later developing portions
of the brain.
Today, these factors are also becoming the markers of
entry into adulthood. As military studies have long
demonstrated, youth has its advantages. The pruning of the
gray matter of the brain allows development to be custom-
tailored to a particular individual's experiences." The result
is an "apprenticeship" that literally directs the formation of
the neural pathways that facilitate learning and lay the
foundation for the assumption of adult responsibilities.
The first step in this transition is the change in focus
from parent-child interactions to peer relationships. Baird
explains that this occurs in part because children entering
adolescence are being biologically primed for reproduction,
and reproduction involves much greater sensitivity to peer
interactions.59 The approval or disapproval of other teens
Moreover, the social meaning of a given act may also influence its emotional
valence. Sunstein gives the example of the different social images associated
with smoking in African-American versus white communities that produce
significantly lower smoking rates among African-American than white teens.
Id. at 10-11.
56. Scott & Steinberg, supra note 13, at 813.
57. For a particularly good summary of the relationship between brain
development and moral decision-making, see Baird, supra note 33, at 7, which
argues that it is the synthesis of visceral and cognitive information that permits
the development of mature judgment. She explains that a critical change in
moral judgment is the ability not just to perceive the difference between right
and wrong, but to experience visceral feelings associated with the thought of
performing wrongful acts. Baird further observes that a brain region with a
demonstrated significant relationship between age and volume (which in turn is
associated with the increase in white matter) is the anterior cingulate cortex, an
area known for its prominent role in the mediation and control of emotional,
attentional, motivational, social, and cognitive behaviors. She suggests that
this area may be particularly critical to the integration of somatic and cognitive
factors essential to development of the moral habits she describes. Id. at 6-7.
58. Id. at 4-5.
59. Id. at 12. Baird further notes that important components of peer
sensitivity are the "imaginary audience," or the sense that others are always
watching and evaluating, and the "personal fable" or the "belief that the self is
unique, invulnerable, and omnipotent." Id. at 9; see also Sunstein, supra note
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becomes a primary concern, and individual ability to discern
and interpret social cues increases rapidly with the change in
orientation. °  Peer reactions then shape in turn the
individual's perception of the acceptability of a course of
conduct.
The second stage involves the internationalization of
learned reactions, a step that requires greater integration of
the cognitive and emotional centers in the brain. Young
adults learn to anticipate the reaction of others before they
occur, and to recognize their own reactions to a possible
choice of action. With this greater self-awareness comes
capacity for the formation of self-conscious emotions as well
as cognitive thought. 1 The settings in which the transition
occurs reinforce the particular pathways that connect thought
and emotion. Thus, military services might prime reactions
to the assertions of authority that are subtly different from
those of students who spend the same formative years in
college.2
The final step connects these internal states to societal
norms, allowing mature, independent judgment. This last
stage allows the individual to experience empathy with
persons unknown as well as known and to allow the
identification not merely with an immediate peer group, but
the larger society and more abstract norms. The mature
individual is also better prepared to exercise conscious choice
in the selection of appropriate objectives, and the individual
decisions necessary to realize them.
While this process is a developmental one, different
individuals may experience it at somewhat different ages
depending on predisposition and experience. Moreover, the
very flexibility of the process makes the individual's
particular pathway to adulthood an important component of
the brain's final architecture. Researchers have no precise
map of these developments; indeed, the relationship between
25, at 4 (discussing research that suggests that risk-taking may be adaptive
because it corresponds to the period when young adults typically leave home in
search of mates).
60. Baird, supra note 33, at 12.
61. Id. at 13.
62. See, e.g., Sunstein, supra note 25, at 10-11 (discussing the different teen
smoking rates in African-American and white communities).
63. Id.
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a specific neural state and any particular action remains
speculative.64  Nonetheless, this research generates new
questions- what decision-making processes work most
effectively in late adolescence-and new appreciation for
traditional insights such as the volatility of and the role of
peer influence in teen behavior. 5 It also suggests that control
of late adolescence, and societal prescription of the
experiences that shape socialization, may be an important
component of the determination of the type of society in which
the young adult is trained to function.
II. 25: THE NEW AGE OF READINESS FOR PARENTHOOD?
Fascinating as this research may be, the temptation is to
ask: so what? Even if researchers further establish distinct
patterns of adolescent and early adult brain development, it
does not necessarily change either the issues we entrust to
teen decisions," or their responsibility for the results.
64. Brain research provides convincing evidence of brain function when
damage to a particular part of the brain corresponds to an inability to perform
certain tasks. See, e.g., DAVID J. LINDEN, THE ACCIDENTAL MIND: How BRAIN
EVOLUTION HAS GIVEN US LOVE, MEMORY, DREAMS AND GOD 14, 17 (2007).
MRI studies show a correlation between particular areas of the brain and
various activities and establish a particular causal relationship between the
activity in any area of the brain and particular behaviors. The research on
more complex activities, such as judgment, necessarily involves an element of
speculation about the implications of more testable factors such as MRI results
that show activation of different parts of the brain at different ages.
65. Indeed, Naomi Cahn and I have argued with respect to behavioral
biology more broadly that the most important legal implications involve the
generation of new questions. The answers and the corresponding policy
prescriptions will need to stand on more traditional considerations of efficacy
and justice, not just on their consonance with the brain research. See June
Carbone & Naomi Cahn, The Biological Basis of Commitment: Does One Size Fit
All?, 25 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 223, 224 (2004).
66. Even these issues do not turn on any simple-minded conclusion that
teens are incapable of reaching appropriate decisions. Indeed, a leading
analysis by Jennifer Drobac argues that teens should enjoy more, not less,
autonomy in decision-making that affects them. The key to their conclusions
lies in the context of the decisions. Teen-doctor interactions, for example,
whether they involve tests for sexually-transmitted diseases or access to
contraception, involve professional guidance. Indeed, the principal impact of
greater teen autonomy, especially in cases of hostile or strained parental
relationships, may in fact be entry into a structured relationship (doctor-
patient) rather than evasion of formal restrictions through teen networks (peer-
supplied condoms).
67. The Supreme Court's decision to ban the juvenile death penalty, for
example, though almost certainly influenced by research showing that teens
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Instead, Naomi Cahn and I have argued elsewhere that a
better understanding of the biological bases of behavior does
not stand in isolation, but rather helps explain the patterns
that underlie social institutions. For any society, patterns of
family formation will be an important social determinant.
Today, those patterns are driven to a significant degree by a
change in the age of family formation.
A. The New Pathways to Adulthood
The intersection of family formation with mature brain
development has varied over time. Baird suggests that the
first stage of puberty involves sexual maturity and the shift
in focus from parents to peers is an understandable first step
in preparation for reproduction. In most societies,
marriage-and the structure marriage brings-follows
relatively quickly after full sexual maturity, at least for
women. Some societies, for example, arrange marriages for
prepubescent girls.6" Their entry into adult roles then takes
place under their husband's supervision. Most societies, of
course, wait at least until the bride is physically of age, but
any society that values virginity closely supervises the period
between puberty and marriage.69 Moreover, for women whose
adult roles are closely tied to childbearing and housekeeping,
why wait? Women's fertility-and presumably her
attractiveness to potential mates, peaks by the early
twenties.7 °  Women's socialization into adulthood has
might fully exhibit mature judgment and the ability to appreciate the
implications of their action, stood independently on the Court's interpretation of
the Eighth Amendment's prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment. See
Roper v. Simons, 543 U.S. 551, 553 (2005).
68. See, e.g., Judith E. Tucker, Ties that Bound: Women and Family in
Eighteenth- and Nineteenth-Century Nablus, in WOMEN IN MIDDLE EAST
HISTORY: SHIFTING BOUNDARIES IN SEX AND GENDER 233, 238 (Nikki R. Keddie
& Beth Baron eds., 1993) (finding that nineteen of 107 marriage contracts
recorded in Nablus in the eighteenth century involved prepubescent girls);
HANS A. BAER, MERRILL SINGER & IDA SUSER, MEDICAL ANTHROPOLOGY AND
THE WORLD SYSTEM 288 (2003) (describing the practice of arranging marriages
of prepubescent girls to boys a few years older in certain communities studied).
69. See, e.g., STONE, supra note 1, at 401-02, 408 (1979) (commenting on the
relationship between class and female chastity and the extraordinary levels of
sexual repression necessary to limit births and contain them within marriage);
David J. Hacker, Rethinking the "Early" Decline of Marital Fertility in the
United States, 40 DEMOGRAPHY 605, 606-07 (2003) (also noting fertility levels in
England and comparing them to circumstances in the U.S.).
70. Class not only affects young women's social readiness for intimate
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typically taken place within the context of courtship and
marriage-experiences that place a premium on stereotypical
gender roles.
The picture for men is more varied. Males typically
mature later than women and marry later.7' In societies that
emphasize financial independence as a precondition for
marriage, many men marry late or not at all. 72  English
society in the seventeenth century carried these patterns to
extraordinary lengths. Average marriage ages rose to the
mid-twenties for women and substantially later for men, with
a fifth of the population not marrying at all. 73 For those who
marry that late in life, habits and character are forged in
contexts other than courtship and reproduction. In many
periods, classes, or societies, however, both men and women
marry soon after sexual maturity. Akerloff, Yellen, and Katz,
for example, describe courtship among working class San
Franciscans in the early sixties as "sexual" and "brief." They
relationships, but factors such as the absence of a father in the home may affect
the age of menarche. See, e.g., Sabine Hoier, Father Absence and Age at
Menarche: A Test for Evolutionary Models, 14 HUM. NATURE 209 (2003).
71. The two, of course, need not be directly related. Girls enter puberty at
earlier ages than boys, but the relationship between the hormonal changes that
begin in early adolescence and the continuing brain development that continues
into the twenties is not well understood. See De Bellis et al., supra note 23, at
46-47 (asserting, in a 2001 study, that it is the first effort to assess gender
differences in brain maturation associated with the relative growth of gray and
white matter). Differences in the assumption of adult responsibilities, on the
other hand, vary greatly with the expectations of the particular society. For an
extreme example, see Michael Slackman, Stifled, Egypt's Young Turn to Islamic
Fervor, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 17, 2007, available at http://www.nytimes.com (search
"Slackman, Michael, stifled" and follow hyperlink "GENERATION FAITHFUL:
Dreams Stifled, Egypt's Youth Turn to Islamic Fervor") (finding that the
average age of marriage for men in Egypt has risen to thirty-one because so
many prospective grooms cannot raise the money necessary for the increasingly
expensive weddings customary in Egyptian society).
72. Elizabeth Fussell & Frank F. Furstenberg, Jr., The Transition to
Adulthood During the Twentieth Century: Race, Nativity, and Gender, in ON
THE FRONTIER OF ADULTHOOD: THEORY, RESEARCH, AND PUBLIC POLICY 29
(Frank F. Furstenberg, Jr., Ruben G. Rumbaut, & Richard A. Settersten, Jr.
eds., 2004) (noting that for men of Western European origin, stable employment
was a precursor to the ability to form a family and that in the first half of the
twentieth century such employment was generally attainable by age twenty,
but no longer is today).
73. E. A. Wrigley & R.S. Schofield, THE POPULATION HISTORY OF ENGLAND
1541-1871, at 162 (Cambridge Univ. Press 1981) (1989); see also J. David
Hacker, Rethinking the "Early" Decline of Marital Fertility in the United States,
40 DEMOGRAPHY 605, 620 (2003).
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
describe a young man, explaining, "If a girl gets pregnant,
you married her. There wasn't no choice. So I married her.7
Marriage in such circumstances then brought substantial
pressure for the man to support his family, and the woman to
stay with him so long as he did.75 For these couples, the
improvident pregnancy triggered the assumption of adult
responsibilities the couple might have preferred to postpone.76
Over the last half-century, patterns of American family
formation have been transformed. The fifties set the stage as
the as-yet-unheralded beginning of the sexual revolution and
the changes from a manufacturing to information economy
collided. Stephanie Coontz observes that "[a]t the end of the
1940's, all the trends characterizing the rest of the twentieth
century suddenly reversed themselves. For the first time in
more than one hundred years, the age of marriage and
motherhood fell, divorce rates declined, and women's degree
of educational parity with men dropped sharply."77 By 1960,
the number of brides pregnant at the altar rose to 30%, a
level last seen in 1800.78
At the same time, however, heavy manufacturing-and
relatively high paying blue-collar positions-began to move
overseas, and the demand for a more educated workforce
grew.7 9 The expansion of the service sector brought growth in
74. George Akerloff, Janet Yellin & Michael Katz, An Analysis of Out-of-
Wedlock Childbearing in the United States, 111 Q. J. ECON. 277, 279 (1996).
75. See, e.g., MILTON C. REGAN, JR., FAMILY LAW AND THE PURSUIT OF
INTIMACY 28 (1993).
76. See, e.g., Frank F. Furstenberg, Jr., Ruben G. Rumbaut, & Richard A.
Settersten, Jr., Emerging Themes and New Directions, in ON THE FRONTIER OF
ADULTHOOD: THEORY, RESEARCH, AND PUBLIC POLICY 3, supra note 72, at 4-5
(noting that in the 1950s, close to half of all women were married by the age of
twenty, many of them already pregnant by the time that they entered
matrimony; thus, adulthood occurred at the end of a relatively brief period of
adolescence).
77. STEPHANIE COONTZ, THE WAY WE NEVER WERE: AMERICAN FAMILIES
AND THE NOSTALGIA TRAP 25 (1992).
78. LINDA HIRSHMAN & JANE LARSON, HARD BARGAINS: THE POLITICS OF
SEX 92 (1998).
79. For example, during the same period disparity in earnings between the
highly educated and those with low levels of schooling widened. In the late
seventies male college graduates' earnings were 33% higher than those of high
school graduates; by the end of the eighties this advantage had increased to 53%
and the returns to education and skills continued to increase during the
nineties. Mary Corcoran & Jordan Matsudaira, Is it Getting Harder to Get
Ahead? Economic Attainment in Early Adulthood for Two Cohorts, in ON THE
FRONTIER OF ADULTHOOD: THEORY, RESEARCH, AND PUBLIC POLICY 356, supra
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the positions traditionally held by women-office workers,
health care providers, restaurant employees, etc.-and the
more general expansion of the white collar ranks increased
the returns to investment in women's education and
workforce participation."0 Something had to give if women
were simultaneously marrying younger, having more
children, dropping out of school more readily, and being more
heavily recruited into the family-unfriendly paid labor
market.1
The first things to give way were the families of the
fifties. Younger marriages and shotgun weddings correlate
with higher divorce rates, and the no-fault legislation enacted
in the seventies unleashed the pent-up demand for divorce
that had begun building with the explosion of younger
marriages. Divorce rates increased exponentially, peaking in
the late seventies at roughly the point where the baby boom
children were leaving home.
More divorce fueled in turn greater wariness about
marriage, and greater access to contraception and abortion
made it easier to delay marriage and child-bearing. During
the "baby-bust" years of the seventies, fertility rates
plummeted as younger couples invested more in men's and
women's education, and postponed marriage and
childbearing. While overall fertility has risen recently, the
intervening quarter century transformed pathways into
adulthood. A striking change is the age at first marriage.
For women, the median age rose from 20 in 1961 to 25.3 in
2005. For men, it increased from twenty-two to twenty-seven
note 72, at 357.
80. Frank F. Furstenberg, Jr., Ruben G. Rumbaut & Richard A. Settersten,
Jr., Between Adolescence and Adulthood: Expectations about the Timing of
Adulthood 4 (The Network on Transitions to Adulthood and Public Policy,
Research Network Working Paper No. 1, 2003), available at
http'//www.transad.pop.upenn.edu/downloads/between.pdf; see also Michael J.
Shanahan, Pathways to Adulthood in Changing Societies: Variability and
Mechanisms in Life Course Perspective, 26 ANN. REV. OF Soc. 667, 673 (2000).
81. Indeed, Furstenberg and Fussell emphasized that something had to give
for the men as well, as they felt increasing pressure to gain greater skills
through prolonged formal education, and at the same time, to marry and
establish families. They report that starting in the seventies men began
postponing family formation in ever larger numbers that spanned every
measurable group. Fussell & Furstenberg, supra note 72, at 29.
82. COONTZ, supra note 77, at 167.
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in the same time period. 3 The mother's age at first birth
followed a similar pattern, rising from twenty-one in 1961 to
twenty-four by 1995.4
These changes mean that the median ages for first
marriage and first birth have shifted from the period in late
adolescence in which social judgment and adult habits are
still forming to the period of full maturity in the mid-
twenties. The shift in the patterns of family formation
corresponds to the change in survey data identifying the
hallmarks of adulthood. Researchers find, for example, that
whereas in 1960, 77% of the men and 65% of the women had
completed all of the major transitions (leaving home,
finishing school, becoming financially independent, getting
married and having a child) by the age of thirty. Yet in 2000,
only 46% of women and 31% of men age thirty had done so.85
The changes have been particularly dramatic for women. In
1960, 30% of the twenty year olds, and 70% of the twenty-five
year olds had completed all of the major life events. In 2000,
by contrast, only 6% of the women had done so by twenty, and
25% by age twenty-five.86
With these changes, Americans have also shifted their
attitudes toward the markers of adulthood. Ninety-five
percent consider education, employment, financial
independence, and the ability to support a family to be
important milestones on the path to adulthood. Considerably
fewer emphasize marriage or children, and overwhelming
majorities reject mere assumption of such roles as critical in
itself.8 7  Moreover, the majority of Americans believe that
young adults ought not be ready to support a family before
their mid-twenties, and that many will not be able to do so
until their thirties.8 8 Instead, younger Americans list first
the ability to "accept responsibility for the consequences of
83. U.S. Census Bureau, Estimated Median Age at First Marriage, by Sex:
1890 to the Present (Sept. 21, 2006),
http'J/www.census.gov/population/socdemo/hh-fam/ms.pdf"
84. U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Median Age of Mother
by Live-birth Order, According to Race and Hispanic Origin: United States,
Selected Years 1940-1997 tbl. 1-5,
http'//www.cdc.gov/nchs/datalstatab/tablxO5ap.pdf (last visited Mar. 21, 2008).
85. Fursterberg, Jr., Rumbaut & Settersten, Jr., supra note 80, at 3.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 6-7.
88. Id. at 10.
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your actions" followed by the capacity to "decide on personal
beliefs and values," with "establish [ing] a relationship with
parents as an equal adult" and being "financially
independent" close behind. 9 The traits that now mark
adulthood are those associated with full cognitive and
emotional maturity and financial independence.
B. Family Formation and Inequality
While all American social and economic classes have
experienced considerable change in family formation
practices, the implications do not play out evenly along class,
race, or regional lines. Instead, they have exacerbated
existing inequalities. The changes have paid off handsomely
for those who have delayed marriage and childbearing,
invested in women's as well as men's workforce participation,
and embraced the new more egalitarian family roles.
Everyone else has seen support for more traditional family
values erode without another model commanding consensus
support. As a whole, therefore, the resources available for the
average child have declined even as they have increased
dramatically for those cashing in on what I have called
elsewhere "the new middle-class morality."90
Sara McLanahan documents the results.9 She observes
that for the upper quarter of the population, defined in
accordance with the mothers' educational attainment, things
look rosy. Compared to forty years ago, the mothers whose
educational achievements place them in the upper quarter of
the population reap the benefits of the new system: the
89. Jeffrey Jenson Arnett, Conceptions of the Transition to Adulthood:
Perspectives from Adolescence through Midlife, 8 J. ADULT DEV. 133, 142 (2001).
90. June Carbone, Review Essay, Is Fertility the Unspoken Issue in the
Debate Between Liberal and Conservative Family Values?, 32 LAW & SOC.
INQUIRY 809, 831 (2007). For an articulation of the values underlying the new
middle-class model, see LINDA C. MCCLAIN, THE PLACE OF FAMILIES:
FOSTERING CAPACITY, EQUALITY, AND RESPONSIBILITY (2006). Marriage ages
have risen more sharply than the age of first birth, indicating a dramatically
higher rate of non-marital children. The percentage of non-marital births in the
United States rose from 5.3% in 1960 to 36.8% in 2005. These figures reflect, in
part, the mother's age of birth. Over 50% of children born to mothers between
twenty and twenty-four were non-marital in contrast with about a quarter of
the births born to women in their late twenties. Taken cumulatively, the
percentage of children living with two married parents has fallen from 87% in
1969 to 67% in 2005. Id. at 90.
91. McLanahan, supra note 2, at 607.
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mothers raise children at a more mature age (from twenty-six
in 1970 to thirty-two in 2000)92 and are more likely to be
working at well-paying jobs giving their children access to
substantially more resources.93 The labor force participation
of the most educated mothers has increased from below 20%
in 1970 to over 60% in 2000 while for the least educated, it
has risen to only 30% with much of the gain coming during
the prosperous nineties.94 Moreover, with income rising more
dramatically for the better off, family income for well-
educated, two-earner parents have skyrocketed. Between
1970 and 2000, the median family income of the best-
educated group increased from $50,000 to $78,000 per year
while the median income for the least-educated families
declined and the middle held steady.9 5
More surprisingly, children of the best-educated mothers
enjoy more, not less, time with their parents than did
children of earlier generations. The adult unions that
produce children are at least as stable as they were forty
years ago. For the best-educated group, the percentage of
single mothers reached its height at just under 10% in 1980
and declined to 7% by 2000.96 In contrast, for the least
educated mothers, the percentage of single parenthood
peaked just below 50% in 1990, and declined to 42% in 2000.97
Divorce rates present similarly dramatic contrasts. For the
best educated, divorce rates peaked in the late seventies at
approximately 2%, then fell steadily through the end of
eighties when they returned to the levels of the mid-sixties
92. Id. at 609.
93. Id. at 608.
94. Id. at 611 fig.2. For the least-educated, the labor force participation
rates rose from 12% in 1970 to 18% in 1990, but then increased steadily to 30%
over the course of the nineties. For everyone else, in contrast, the gains accrue
steadily from the seventies forward. Id. The most recent figures suggest that
the labor force gains for never-married mothers peaked in 2001, and then
leveled off with the weaker economy of the last few years. See U.S. DEP'T OF
HEALTH AND HUM. SERVS., INDICATORS OF WELFARE DEPENDENCE: ANNUAL
REPORT TO CONGRESS 111-35 tbl.8 (2007),
http://aspe.hhs.gov/hsp/indicatorsO7/ch3.pdf (citing U.S. Dep't of Labor, Bureau
of Labor Statistics (unpublished tabulations from The Current Population
Survey, Annual Social and Economic Supplement, 1975-2005)).
95. McLanahan, supra note 2, at 614 fig.6.
96. Id. at 612 fig.3.
97. Id.
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(18%), the era before no-fault divorce.9" For the least well off,
on the other hand, the rates peaked at 35% in the late
seventies, and then leveled off, falling only slightly to 32% by
the end of the eighties.99 The changing levels of parental
involvement complete the picture. From 1975 to 2000,
fathers have substantially increased the amount of time they
spend with their children, with the most dramatic increases
coming for married fathers during the late nineties, and
better educated fathers spending more time than less-
educated fathers. 100 Working mothers, while spending less
time at home than forty years ago, have primarily cut back on
the amount of time spent on housework rather than on
childcare. 101
Taken together, then, the best off children are just as
likely as the comparable group forty years ago to live in stable
two-parent families, and these families provide even more
advantages in terms of access to greater income and parental
time and investment.0 2 For the least well-off portion of the
population, however, the changes in family form exacerbate
societal inequalities. The children in these families are
dramatically more likely than either the well-off or the poor of
forty years ago to be raised in single-parent families, with
access to parental time and money that is a much smaller
percentage of the resources available to their better off peers.
The family has become a site for the reproduction of
inequality.' °
C. Institutions and Immaturity
The changes in family form-the increases in non-marital
births, divorces, and co-habitation-are well documented.
The class-based nature of the changes, however, has received
98. Id. at 613 fig.4.
99. Id. at fig.5.
100. Id. The highest rate of increase, however, was for non-college-educated,
married fathers during the period from 1995 to 2000. McLanahan, supra note
2, at 613 fig.5.
101. Id. at 610.
102. Id. at 608 (concluding that "[c]hildren who were born to mothers from
the most advantaged backgrounds are making substantial gains in resources.
Relative to their counterparts 40 years ago, their mothers are more mature and
more likely to be working at well-paying jobs. These children were born into
stable unions and are spending more time with their fathers.").
103. Id. at 614-15.
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attention only more recently. 0 4 To the extent these changes
have been the subject of debate, that debate has suggested
that morals, values, and behavior of the disadvantaged
should be the focus of attention.'0 5  This emphasis on
responsibility implies that marriage should be the answer-if
only women held out for at least an engagement, men would
become more willing to commit to their partners and
offspring, and more likely to take on the economic roles
necessary to realize those commitments.0 6 In response,
William Junius Wilson initially argued that the changing
labor market held the key; that the disappearance of high
paying manufacturing jobs for relatively unskilled men made
them less attractive marriage partners. 10 7 Further research
demonstrated that the family behavior of better-employed
men, however, fared no better than that of their lesser-
employed peers, and employment could explain only a small
percentage of the family changes.' 8  Economists George
Akerloff, Janet Yellin, and Michael Katz suggested that the
changes in family form could be explained without a change
104. Of course, these issues first attracted national attention with
publication of the Moynihan Report in the mid-sixties, calling attention to the
increasing percentage of single-parent African-American families. DANIEL
PATRICK MOYNIHAN, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR OFFICE OF PLANNING AND RESEARCH,
THE NEGRO FAMILY: THE CASE FOR NATIONAL ACTION (Greenwood Press 1981)
(1965). The intense reaction to the report discouraged study of the racial
dynamic underlying family breakup for a generation. During the eighties,
Charles Murray attempted to sound an alarm suggesting that white working-
class families were following the same pattern as the African-American shifts
Moynihan highlighted. CHARLES MURRAY, LOSING GROUND: AMERICAN SOCIAL
POLICY 1950-1980, at 162 (1994). For a summary of this debate, see CARBONE,
supra note 6. More recently, Amy Wax has examined the class- and race-based
nature of the shift in family form. See Amy L. Wax, Engines of Inequality: Race,
Class, and Families Structure, 41 FAM. L.Q. 567 (2007).
105. Charles Murray called attention to the increasing non-marital birth
rates among whites as well as African-Anericans and attributed the cause to
the expansion of welfare. MURRAY, supra note 104, at 162.
106. See, e.g., JAMES Q. WILSON, THE MARRIAGE PROBLEM: HOW OUR
CULTURE HAS WEAKENED FAMILIES 16-21 (2002) (arguing that the issue is
rooted in culture, not economics, and is centuries in the making).
107. See WILLIAM JULIUS WILSON, WHEN WORK DISAPPEARS: THE WORLD OF
THE NEW URBAN POOR 3-24 (1996); see also WILLIAM JULIUS WILSON, THE
TRULY DISADVANTAGED (1987).
108. Robert D. Mare & Christopher Winship, Socioeconomic Change and the
Decline of Marriage for Blacks and Whites, in THE URBAN UNDERCLASS 175,
190-92 (Christopher Jencks & Paul E. Peterson eds., 1991); Robert G. Wood,
Marriage Rates and Marriageable Men: A Test of the Wilson Hypothesis, 30 J.
HUM. RESOURCES 163, 188 (1995).
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in morals. That is, they argued that the advent of birth
control and abortion changed the number of women willing to
engage in sex without a promise to marry, and those women
who wanted commitment from their mates were
correspondingly less able to secure it. 10 9 The women ready to
begin childbearing at earlier ages accordingly became more
willing to have a child outside of the marriages they preferred
(even if fewer women overall had children as a result of
unplanned pregnancies) and these women-the ones ready to
begin childrearing without marriage-are overwhelmingly
younger and poorer." °
Only in the last few years have researchers begun to
examine these changes not just in terms of changing mores,
or in terms of the move away from marriage, but in terms of a
new organization of the life course. McLanahan emphasizes
that one of the things that distinguishes the family formation
practices of the successful elite from their less well-educated
peers is age of childbearing."' For the upper quarter of
women in her study, the median age of mothers with children
under five rose from twenty-six in 1970 to thirty-two in
2000.112 For the rest of the population, it moved up only
slightly, increasing from twenty-two to twenty-three for the
bottom quartile, and from twenty-four to twenty-six for the
middle group." 3 The differences in age play out by race at
well. Birth rates for African-Americans are higher than the
white rates at every age up until twenty-five and lower at
every age thereafter.14  This means that the age of full
psychological maturity-the mid-twenties -has become a
class and race-based divide for family formation. The elite
now overwhelming defer childbearing until the age in life
where the socialization into adulthood has already occurred;
the less advantaged continue to bear children at an age in life
where family stability is harder to engineer. What are the
consequences?
The most immediate are the greater resources older
109. Akerloff, Yellin & Katz, supra note 74, at 307-08.
110. Id.
111. McLanahan, supra note 2, at 609.
112. Id. at 610 fig.1.
113. Id.
114. Child Trends Data Bank, Percentage of Births to Unmarried Women 2
fig.1 (2006), available at http://www.childtrendsdatabank.orgpdf/75_PDF.pdf.
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parents bring to childrearing. Parents in their late twenties
are better educated, psychologically more mature, and more
likely to interact with and stimulate young children than are
younger parents. 115  Moreover, they are almost certainly
wealthier, with more material resources to spend on their
children, and more of a financial cushion to weather
unexpected difficulties. 1
6
Research indicates, moreover, that age is an independent
factor in predicting children's outcomes even controlling for
the mother's circumstances. In a thirty-year-follow-up study
that measured children's well-being in terms of educational
attainment, financial independence between ages twenty-
seven and thirty-three, and childbearing after the age of
twenty, researchers found that mothers over the age of
twenty-five had the best outcomes, and teens the worst, after
controlling for other factors."' John Mirowsky and Catherine
E. Ross further report that maternal depression is greater for
women who have their first child before the age of twenty-
three, and falls to its lowest level for women experiencing a
first birth around thirty."18 They observe that "[a]n early first
birth suggests a poor start in life. It may reflect a disordered
transition from adolescence into adulthood and may itself
115. Note that these figures include women with children who range from
birth to five, not just the age at which the mothers give birth. McLanahan,
supra note 2, at 609. Of course, the superiority of older parents has its limits.
McLanahan notes that most of the studies finding poor-quality parenting from
younger families focus on teens. Id. at n.6. Other studies note that the risk of
infertility or birth defects rise with age and for single mothers, assistance from
parents and other collateral relatives may decrease with age. See, e.g., J.
Menken, J. Trussell & U. Larsen, Age and Infertility, 23 SCIENCE 1389 (1986);
Dawn P. Misra & Cande V. Ananth, Infant Mortality Among Singletons and
Twins in the United States During 2 Decades: Effects of Maternal Age, 110
PEDIATRICS 1163 (2002); Suzanne C. Tough et al., Delayed Childbearing and its
Impact on Population Rate Changes in Lower Birth Weight, Multiple Birth, and
Preterm Delivery, 109 PEDIATRICS 399 (2002).
116. See ELIZABETH GREGORY, READY: WHY WOMEN ARE EMBRACING THE
NEW LATER MOTHERHOOD 8-9 (2007). See also McLanahan, supra note 2, at
609. Of course, older parents may also be less energetic, less flexible, and less
likely to assist adult children and grandchildren.
117. Janet B. Hardy et al., Adolescent Childbearing Revisited: The Age of
Inner-city Mothers at Delivery Is a Determinant of Their Children's Self-
sufficiency at Age 27 to 33, 100 PEDIATRICS 802, 807-08 (1997).
118. John Mirowsky & Catherine E. Ross, Depression, Parenthood, and Age
at First Birth, 54 SOC. SCI. & MED. 1281, 1289-90 (2002) (finding maternal
depression greater with younger age of first birth, and the least depression in
first-time mothers around age thirty).
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disrupt that transition, with life long consequences that
influence emotional well-being."119 They also indicate that
the lesser depression that comes with greater parental age
may correlate with later first marriages, higher educational
attainment, lower risk of having had a prolonged period
needing a job but not being able to find one, lower risk of
having had periods lacking the money for household
necessities, and better current physical health. 2 °
The more profound advantages, therefore, may have to do
with the new patterns of partnership formation.
Evolutionary analysis suggests that younger adults are more
focused on the creation of new children, while older adults are
focused on the survival of their existing children. 12'
Researchers have wondered about the role of grandmothers,
who, once the age of childbearing has passed, devote
considerable energy to the survival of their grandchildren.1 22
Others have noted that, even with adults still able to bear
additional children, relationships become more stable after
the mid-twenties. Testosterone levels peak in the mid-
twenties and decline thereafter. 23  So, too, does divorce,
infidelity and alcohol consumption. 2 4 Later union formation
may increase the odds of stability and success with less
societal energy or coercion.
Selecting a mate, moreover, may involve less guesswork.
In the early twenties, many prospective suitors look alike,
with unrealized promise for as yet unchosen careers. By the
late twenties, their prospects are clearer. Alcohol and drug
119. Id. at 1281.
120. Id.
121. Baird, supra note 33, at 11.
122. K. Hawkes et al., Grandmothering, Menopause, and the Evolution of
Human Life Histories, 95 PRoC. NAT'L. ACAD. Sci. 1336, 1336-38 (1998)
(demonstrating that humans are unusual in the length of our life spans after
reproduction is no longer possible, and speculating that grandmothers'
contributions to their daughters' nutrition enhances their fertility).
123. JAMES MCBRIDE DABBS & MARY GODWIN DABBS, HEROES, ROGUES AND
LOVERS: TESTOSTERONE AND BEHAVIOUR (2000) (stating that male testosterone
levels peak after twenty and decline continuously thereafter; average levels are
lower for married men than single men).
124. Helen Fisher speculates that relationships may become more stable
with age because testosterone levels peak during the mid-twenties and the
temptation to seek new partners may decline with falling testosterone levels.
HELEN FISHER, WHY WE LOVE: THE NATURE AND CHEMISTRY OF ROMANTIC
LOVE 201 (2004).
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abuse, for example, will be apparent by that point, rather
than part of the rite of passage in which the majority of young
adults indulge. 125 Sexual identity is more likely to be firmly
established and therefore less of a surprise reason for
relationship breakups. Serious psychological problems are
more likely to be manifest. And career prospects and
financial habits should be much more readily apparent.
Those who are poor risks-substance abusers, violent
personalities, those unable to hold steady jobs, the
bankrupt-may be less likely to marry at all. 126 Those who
are more successful may in turn find it easier to find a mate
who shares their background and interests. McLanahan
observes that assortative mating, with the best-educated
choosing mates with similar educational achievements, is
more common than it was forty years ago. 127 Both the
tendency of like to marry like and the accuracy of these
predictions may increase the level of societal inequality. 128
The most far-reaching changes, however, may be a
change in the societal structure that shapes the socialization
into adulthood. In a trenchant review of these societal
changes, Amy Wax seeks to explain why the middle class,
which would otherwise appear to accept a variety of family
forms, so unequivocally embraces marriage as the locus for
childbearing while so high a percentage of the poor do not.2 9
Her answer: despite the equal if not greater advantages of
marriage for the least advantaged, relationships do not work
because of bad behavior by men. She observes:
[T]he women... almost never complain about their men's
earning power. Rather, the book is replete with evidence
that men's antisocial behavior, not unfulfilled economic
expectations, is the main obstacle to matrimony. To be
sure, these women's accusations have an economic aspect:
they accuse the men of being unwilling to grasp
opportunities, work steadily, and spend wisely. ... These
125. See Alison A. Moore et al., Longitudinal Patterns and Predictors of
Alcohol Consumption in the United States, 95 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 458, 458-62
(2005).
126. See, e.g., Eduardo Porter & Michelle O'Donnell, Facing Middle Age with
No Degree, and No Wife, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 6, 2006, at Al, A18 (reporting on drop
in marriage rates of least-educated men).
127. McLanahan, supra note 2, at 614.
128. Id. (suggesting limits on intergenerational mobility).
129. Wax, supra note 104, at 585.
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women's most vociferous complaints are reserved for
men's chronic criminal behavior, drug use, violence, and,
above all, repeated and flagrant sexual infidelity ...
These men's sexual habits - and women's complicity in
them - produced conflict, jealousy, resentment, mistrust
and tumultuous personal lives .... These women do not
hold their men to new and higher standards. Rather, they
ask for the basics of responsible male behavior. Women
have always expected this from their husbands, but upper-
middle-class women now seem to get it far more often. 130
Wax is referring to studies of the least well off, but while
the factors Wax cites may create more difficulties for poorer
populations, all the indicia of "bad behavior" improve with
age. Start with alcohol. General studies show that alcohol
use tends to peak in the late teens and early twenties and
declines thereafter.'3 1 Binge drinking and marijuana use
similarly increase in the years immediately after teens leave
home and decrease steadily after the early twenties.1 32
The same pattern is true of crime and violence. Indeed,
Darrell Steffensmeir and Jeffery Ulmer report that:
The view that involvement in crime diminishes with age is
one of the oldest and most widely accepted in criminology.
Beginning with the pioneering research by Adolphe
Quetelet in the early nineteenth century, criminological
research consistently has confirmed that (the proportion
of) the population involved in crime tends to peak in
adolescence or early adulthood and then decline with
age. 13
3
The FBI's 2006 crime statistics confirm, for example, that
arrests for violent crime peak at eighteen, and decline
gradually thereafter while all arrests combined reach their
height a year later at nineteen, and show a similar,
130. Id. at 590.
131. See Moore et al., supra note 125, at 462 (showing sharp decline in
alcohol consumption with age; binge drinking peaks during the eighteen to
twenty-two age range).
132. John Schulenberg et al., Early Adult Transitions and Their Relation to
Well-Being and Substance Use, in ON THE FRONTIER OF ADULTHOOD: THEORY,
RESEARCH, AND PUBLIC POLICY 417, supra note 72, at 424.
133. Darrell Steffensmeier & Jeffery Ulmer, Law Library - American Law
and Legal Information: Crime and Justice Vol. 1, Age and Crime - Age-crime
Patterns For The U.S., Variations In The Age Curve, Variations In Criminal
Careers, http://law.jrank.orgtpages/ 479/Age-Crime.html (last visited Mar. 21,
2008).
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graduated decline. 134
Further evidence suggests that the number of sexual
partners declines with age, controlling for marital status, 135
and that infidelity is higher for younger spouses. 136
Personality traits continue to change into adulthood as well.
A U.C. Berkeley study, for example, found that
conscientiousness increased from twenty-one through age
sixty, with the biggest increases in the twenties.137 These
findings across a variety of behavioral attributes correlate
with other studies that show that increased age is a
protective factor for relationship stability.138
134. U.S. Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation Criminal
Justice Information Services Division, 2006 Crime in the United States tbl.38,
http://www.fbi.gov/ucr/cius2006/data/table_38.html (last visited Mar. 21, 2008).
The impact of imprisonment in aggravating inequality is potentially staggering.
The Fragile Families and Child Well-Being study at Princeton University
reports, for example, that (1) one in forty white children born in 1978 and one in
twenty-five white children born 1990 had an imprisoned parent; (2) one in seven
black children born 1978 and one in four black children born in 1990 had an
imprisoned parent; (3) inequality in the risk of parental imprisonment between
white children of college-educated parents and all other children is growing; and
(4) 50.5% of black children born in 1990 to high school dropouts had an
imprisoned father by age fourteen. The study further finds that the
incarceration of a parent living with a child increases the likelihood of boys'
aggressive behavior during childhood, and those behaviors correlate with
increased risk of future criminality. Christopher Wildeman, Parental
Imprisonment, the Prison Boom, and the Concentration of Childhood
Disadvantage 1 (Princeton Univ. Ctr. for Res. on Child Wellbeing, Working
Paper No. 2007-22-F, May 2008), available at
http://crcw.princeton.edu/publications/articles/2008/WP07-22-FF.pdf.
135. EDWARD 0. LAUMANN ET AL., THE SOCIAL ORGANIZATION OF SEXUALITY:
SEXUAL PRACTICES IN THE UNITED STATES 192 (1994) (indicating that the
number of partners declines dramatically with age).
136. Tom W. Smith, American Sexual Behavior: Trends, Socio-Demographic
Differences, and Risk Behavior 54 tbl.7 (Univ. of Chicago Nat'l Opinion Res.
Ctr., General Soc. Survey Topical Rep. No. 25, 2006), available at
http://www.norc.orgfnr/rdonlyres/ 2663f09f-2e74-436e-ac81-
6ffbf288e183/0/AmericanSexualBehavior2006.pdf.
137. Sanjay Srivastava, Samuel D. Gosling & Jeff Potter, Development of
Personality in Early and Middle Adulthood: Set Like Plaster or Persistent
Change?, 84 J. PERSONALITY AND SOC. PSYCHOL. 1041, 1041-54 (2003).
Conscientiousness is defined as being organized, planful, and disciplined, and
past research has linked it to work performance and work commitments. The
study found that agreeableness increased the most during a person's 30s while
neuroticism declined with age for women but not men, and openness and
extraversion showed small, uneven, declines with age. Id.
138. Studies have long indicated that early marriage (generally defined as
marriage before the woman turns twenty) produces greater instability. See,
e.g., Allan Booth & John N. Edwards, Age at Marriage and Marital Instability,
47 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 67, 68, 71 (1985) (summarizing literature and observing
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Greater age, of course, is not a magic bullet that
guarantees relationship or financial success. Substance
abuse and infidelity can and do derail intimate partnerships
at any age. Moreover, the severity and form of "bad behavior"
reflect societal circumstances, not just raging hormones or
unpruned gray matter. Juvenile homicides, for example,
spiked in the last decade with greater availability of firearms
and declined with more effective law enforcement. 139  The
greater susceptibility of young adults to riskier, irresponsible
activities may always be with us, but nothing about that
makes high levels of homicide-or a welter of lesser sins-
inevitable.4 °
that age at marriage is the single best predictor of divorce); Barbara Dafoe
Whitehead & David Popenoe, Essay, The Marrying Kind: Which Men Marry and
Why, THE STATE OF OUR UNIONS: THE SOCIAL HEALTH OF MARRIAGE IN
AMERICA, 2004, at 6, available at
http://marriage.rutgers.edu/publications/SOOU/ SOOU2004.pdf. Efforts to
indicate why suggest that greater infidelity at younger ages is a significant
factor. Booth & Edwards, supra at 71; Paul R. Amato & Stacy J. Rogers, A
Longitudinal Study of Marital Problems and Subsequent Divorce, 59 J. OF
MARRIAGE & FAM. 612, 621 (1997). The first comprehensive study by Larry L.
Bumpass & James A. Sweet, Differentials in Marital Instability: 1970, 37 AM.
SOCIOLOGICAL REV. 754 (1972), found that the biggest drops in marital
instability occurred as the woman's age of marriage increased from the mid-
teens to the late teens (a ten-point drop), and that marital stability continued to
improve as women's age at marriage increased from the late teens to the early
twenties (five-point drop), and from the early to mid-twenties (three-point drop).
Id. at 755. The most comprehensive recent study, by the CDC, produced similar
results, showing the greatest gains in marital stability when the women's age at
marriage increases from the late teens to the early twenties. Ctrs. for Disease
Control and Prevention, Cohabitation, Divorce, Marriage and Remarriage in the
United States, 22 VITAL & HEALTH STATS., July 2002, at 55 tbl.21,
http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/series/sr_23/sr23_022.pdf. For African-Americans
and whites, marital stability continues to improve as the brides' age rises from
the early twenties to over twenty-five, but for Latinas, marital stability peaks
with marriage in the early twenties and declines thereafter. Id. at 18 fig.19. In
a parallel study of cohabitation rates, however, the CDC found that the greatest
improvements in stability occurred when the woman's age at the start of
cohabitation increased from the twenty to twenty-four to the over twenty-five
age group. Id. at 49 tbl. 15. In contrast with the marriage figures, the CDC
found no statistically significant differences between the stability of
cohabitation begun in the late teens versus the early twenties. The CDC offered
no explanation for these results. It is possible that the institutional role of
marriage is more critical to relationship success in the early twenties, but the
results may also be explained by differences in the populations who cohabit
earlier rather than later in life.
139. DOJ Study Links Juvenile Homicide Rate to Gun Access Laws,
CNN.com, May 7, 2000, http://archives.cnn.com/2000fUS/03/07/gun.study.
140. Indeed, Darrell Steffensmeier and Jeffery Ulmer, after noting that age-
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Instead, these factors underscore the importance of the
institutions that guide the transition to adulthood. Family
formation at later ages requires less societal energy to
produce successful unions; intimate relationships as vehicles
that steer the transition to adulthood-and the socialization
of unruly young males-require considerably more.
Historically, the institutions that would have managed the
transition included the military, male education, training and
employment, oversight of female sexuality, and socialization
into gendered family roles.14 ' Today, for the middle class
(male and female), it includes university and post-graduate
education, a lengthier period of parent-subsidized acquisition
of workplace experience-and the postponement of family
responsibilities. For a substantial portion of the rest of the
population, it may involve an unmooring from the institutions
that once provided guidance, without a ready replacement in
sight.142
The change in male employment, for example, provides
telling evidence. Corcoran and Matsudaira report, in a
comparison of white and African-American employment, that:
Over 14% of White men and over 40% of African-American
men had accumulated twenty-six or more weeks of non-
work in the three years between ages twenty-four and
twenty-six years. Few White men, 5-6%, but almost one in
four African-American men reported fifty-two or more
weeks of non-work between ages twenty-four to twenty-six
years. Five percent of African-American men in cohort 2
did not work for pay at all between ages twenty-four to
twenty-six.1 43
These employment patterns may mean that young adults
not only lose out on the structure full-time employment
provides, but "miss out on crucial on-the-job training and
crime patterns are a truism of criminology, emphasized that "considerable
variation exists among offenses and across historical periods in specific features
of the age-crime relationship (for example, peak age, median age, rate of decline
from peak age)." Steffensmeier & Ulmer, supra note 133.
141. MILTON C. REGAN, JR., FAMILY LAW AND THE PURSUIT OF INTIMACY 28
(1993) (describing the greater importance of gender roles in constituting
identity in earlier eras).
142. For a comprehensive examination of these changes, see The Network on
Transitions to Adulthood, httpJ/www.transad.pop.upenn.edu (last visited Mar.
15, 2008).
143. Cocoran & Matsudaira, supra note 79, at 386.
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socialization that are prerequisites for future economic
mobility and employment stability."144 Moreover, the lack of
stable employment may also contribute to a lack of
socialization into responsible family roles. The blue-collar-
workforce settings in an era of widespread early marriage
would, after all, have been dominated by husbands and
fathers. Today's more marginal employment settings for
lesser-skilled men may include fewer attractive family role
models. The ideals, leisure activities, and expectations of
unattached men may be quite different from those of
husbands and involved fathers.
Similarly, for working-class women, the transition to
adulthood once took place in the context of early childbearing
that locked women into dependent roles. So long as their
husbands provided support they could not acquire elsewhere,
they may have felt obligated to put up with drunken, abusive,
or simply inconsiderate behavior.14 Today's women, of every
social class, enjoy greater opportunities of their own that may
make them less inclined to put up with the "bad behavior"
Wax describes. The results are mutually reinforcing: weaker
employment opportunities for less-skilled men may make
them less-attractive partners, women's greater independence
may make them less inclined to put up with "poor catches,"
women's lesser dependence may make men feel less
compelled to stay in unsatisfying and poorly paying positions,
and men's lesser employment and weaker family attachments
may undermine inculcation of more responsible behavior,
which may in turn further aggravate both employment and
family stability.
These cycles are not, however, entirely "vicious" ones.
The most striking figures to come out of relatively better
times in the nineties were shifts in childbearing. Teen births
dropped across the board.146 They dropped more for African-
Americans than for whites, and the single largest drop was in
144. Id. at 360.
145. See, e.g., MCCLAIN, supra note 90, at 63 (discussing the prevalence of
domestic violence in eras with higher rates of marriage).
146. Brady E. Hamilton et al., Ctrs. for Disease Control and Prevention,
Births: Preliminary Data for 2006, 56 NAT'L VITAL STAT. REP., Dec. 5, 2007, at 2
(revealing that the pregnancy rate among adolescents fell 34% between 1991
and 2005 before it reversed in 2006, rising by 3% among females aged fifteen to
nineteen).
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the statistic that has the most negative impact on the life
chances of mother and child-viz., a drop for African-
Americans in the number of second teen births. 4  These
drops corresponded to women's increased employment, and
that increased employment contributed to both greater
esteem for the mothers and better material circumstances for
their children. 148  What did not decline was the overall
percentage of non-marital births. These figures suggest a
new female working-class strategy that places greater
emphasis on a mother's autonomy and well-being may hold
the potential to better the position of the entire next
generation as these mothers acquire the ability to invest more
in their children.
The ability to secure greater autonomy and well-being for
working-class mothers, however, improves with a delay in
childbearing from the late teens to at least the early twenties,
assistance in staying in school or gaining employment, and
avoiding the birth of a second child too soon after the first. It
also suggests that marriage may not be as critical as securing
the right support, 49 and that stable partnerships will follow
from improvement in the mother's circumstances; perhaps to
a greater degree than partnerships contribute to creating that
stability in the first place. 5 ° The question at this stage is
147. Joyce A. Martin et al., Ctrs. for Disease Control and Prevention, Births:
Final Data for 2002, 52 NAT'L VITAL STAT. REP., Dec. 17, 2003, at 5. African
Americans ages fifteen to nineteen experienced the steepest decline in birth
rates-42%--from 118 per 1,000 women in 1991 to 68 in 2002. Among African
Americans ages fifteen to seventeen, birth rates dropped by 52% between 1991
and 2002. Id.
148. See infra text accompanying notes 155-72.
149. Fragile Families data indicates that to the extent that women who are
unmarried at the time of their child's birth later marry a man other than the
father, the man they marry tends to better off than the father. See Sharon H.
Bzostek, Marcia J. Carlson, & Sara S. McLanahan, Mothers' Union Formation
Following a Non-Marital Birth: Do Mothers Know Best? 30 (Ctr. for Res. on
Child Well-Being, Working Paper No. 2006-27-FF, 2007),
http://crcw.princeton.edu/workingpapers/WP06-27-FF.pdf ('[Tihe fact that many
mothers are 'trading up' in terms of father quality suggests that family
instability may have benefits as well as costs.").
150. Although all studies show that married couples produce better outcomes
than unmarried couples, this does not mean that any given couple will be better
off simply because they marry. The difficulty lies in teasing out the causal
effects, as more-troubled parents are less likely to marry, and thus married
couples are likely to be different from unmarried couples in ways that go beyond
the marriage itself. For efforts to assess the causal relationships, see, e.g.,
Marcia Carlson, Trajectories of Couple Relationship Quality After Childbirth:
[Vol:48934
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whether there is support for this-or any other-new model.
III. 25: THE AGE OF DIVISION?
Political, social, and financial support for new pathways
to adulthood is difficult to construct without consensus on the
model. Today's recreation of early-adult transitions take
place not only at the intersection of class and racial tensions
but at the heart of what Justice Scalia has termed a "culture
war."' 51 If there is anything the new middle class model
needs to become universal, it is acceptance of the idea that
stable partnerships follow more readily from financial
independence and emotional maturity. And if there is any
controversial idea in today's politically charged times, it is
acceptance of non-marital sexuality as part of the ordinary
passage from adolescence to adulthood. 152 These shifts, which
the middle class has managed through systematic use of
contraception (backed up by access to abortion), are an affront
to more conservative, religious, and traditional groups in the
country. 153 Moreover, as non-marital sexuality, and especially
Does Marriage Matter? 31 (Ctr. for Res. on Child Well-Being, Working Paper
No. 2007-11-FF, 2007), http'//crcw.princeton.edu/workingpapers/WP07-11-
FF.pdf (concluding, after a comparison of couples who cohabit or marry
following a non-marital birth, that "[miarriage at the time of the baby's birth
appears to be protective against rapid decline in relationship quality, and yet,
getting married after the birth does not significantly improve relationship
quality for those who were co-resident anyway"); Cynthia Osborner, Is Marriage
Protective for All Children? Cumulative Risks at Birth and Subsequent Child
Behavior Among Urban Families 13 (Ctr. for Res. on Child Well-Being, Working
Paper No. 2007-09-FF, 2007), http'//crcw.princeton.edu/workingpapers/WP07-
09-FF.pdf (finding that children born to married couples are exposed to fewer
risks such as low birth weights, smoking within the home, maternal depression,
etc., and that these risks explain differences in child outcomes independently of
family status).
151. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 603 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
152. Indeed, as a practical matter, at a time when the average length of the
span from the beginning of sexual activity to marriage has reached eight years,
it is acceptance not only of non-marital sexuality (with 90% of the population
engaging in intercourse before marriage), but of the fact that women are likely
to have multiple intimate partners before marrying. See Lawrence B. Finer,
Trends in Premarital Sex in the United States, 1954-2003, 122 PUB. HEALTH
REP. 73, 75 (2007) (finding that almost all Americans have sex before marrying);
Barbara DaFoe Whitehead, Trends Shaping Youthful Sexuality,
http'J/www.nplc.org/ commonground/papers/whiteheadpaper.htm (last visited
Apr. 9, 2008).
153. For comprehensive examinations of the differences in values, see
KRISTIN LUKER, WHEN SEX GOES TO SCHOOL: WARRING VIEWS ON SEX -- AND
SEX EDUCATION -- SINCE THE SIXTIES 155-57 (2006); Naomi Cahn & June
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non-marital childbearing, are associated with class, racial,
and ethnic divisions, they exacerbate the symbolic and
cultural meanings associated with devising new strategies for
the transition to adulthood. These cultural tensions have
undermined support for any of the most promising forms of
assistance to the new generation, such as improved access to
contraception and assistance in combining work and family.
In the process, they have aggravated the inequalities of the
new family patterns, as they magnify middle class
advantages in adjusting to the new system. These debates-
and their consequences-exist at both the symbolic level, as
cultural dissonance retards the prospects for agreement on
uniform cultural messages, and the practical, as these
tensions undermine support for potentially constructive
measures.
A. Welfare Reform: Misdrawing the Battlelines
The disconnect between the new realities for the working
class and traditional family values occupied a central place in
the welfare reform battles of the nineties. The Aid for
Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) program had
begun in the thirties as a New Deal program primarily
designed to benefit pensionless widows.' By the end of the
sixties, widows had become no more than 10% of the AFDC
caseload, and the Supreme Court struck down the remaining
eligibility restrictions that limited coverage of unmarried
mothers.155 By 1997, 53% of AFDC recipients were never-
Carbone, Deep Purple: Religious Shades of Family Law, 110 W. VA. L. REV. 459
(2008).
154. See CARBONE, supra note 6, at 201. The original "Aid to Dependent
Children" (ADC) covered children who had been "deprived of parental support
or care by reason of death, continual absence from the home, or physical or
mental incapacity of a parent," and allowed the state to set individual eligibility
guidelines. LINDA GORDON, PITIED BUT NOT ENTITLED: SINGLE MOTHERS AND
THE HISTORY OF WELFARE, 1890-1935, at 277 (1994) (quoting 42 U.S.C.A. §
606(a) (West 2003)); see also Lucy A. Williams, The Ideology of Division:
Behavior Modification Welfare Proposals, 102 YALE L.J. 719, 723 n.33 (1992).
155. CARBONE, supra note 6, at 202. The most important remaining
restrictions were the "man in the house" rules that deemed the income of a man
who spent overnights visits available to the family. Id. The Supreme Court
invalidated the restrictions in King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309 (1968) (ruling that
states could not simultaneously declare a home unsuitable for children and
therefore ineligible for assistance, and take no action to remove the children
from the home).
[Vo1:48936
AGE MATTERS
married mothers, and 37% were separated, divorced or
widowed women." 6  Moreover, the program's original
premise-that the mothers of young children were necessarily
dependent-became increasingly untenable as the majority of
all mothers entered the labor market.15 7
Rather than modernize the program, however, the reform
debate centered on the parameters of permissible
motherhood. Congress named the act "the Personal
Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of
1996." 1"s The preamble stated that "prevention of out-of-
wedlock pregnancy and reduction in out-of-wedlock births are
very important Government interests"15 9 and that the policy
contained in the statute was designed to address the crisis in
out-of-wedlock childbearing. 60 The Act accordingly sought to
promote marriage, marital parenting, and paternal
support. 6'
Liberal opposition attacked the act as an assault on
motherhood. Gwendolyn Mink, for example, entitled a book
chapter, "Why Should Poor Single Mothers Have to Work
Outside of the Home? Work Requirements and the Negation
of Mothers." 162 She condemned the act as "intrusive and
patriarchal" because of its insistence that poor women seek
paid employment rather than devote their time to their
children. 163
A decade later, both liberal and conservative economists
rate welfare reform a success. The results have little to do
with marriage, however.164  Instead, the workforce
156. CARBONE, supra note 6, at 203.
157. The labor force participation rates of women with children under
eighteen-years-old peaked in the late nineties at 73% and have declined to just
below 70% since then. Kieren Healy, Some Data on Families in the Workplace
(2005), http://crookedtimber.org/ 2005/09/22/some-data-on-family-earning-
trends.
158. Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of
1996 (PRWORA), 42 U.S.C.S. §§ 601 et seq. (LexisNexis 1996).
159. Id. § 601.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. GWENDOLYN MINK, WELFARE'S END 103 (1998).
163. Id.
164. Andrew Cherlin, David Ribar & Robert Moffitt, Welfare Reform in the
Mid-2000s: How African-American and Hispanic Families in Three Cities are
Faring 23 (Johns Hopkins Univ., Welfare, Children and Families: a Three City
Study, Working Paper No. 07-01, 2007), available at
http://www.conference.aapss.org/papers/aapss-Cherlinet.al.pdf (reporting that
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participation of single mothers increased substantially, and
their poverty rates fell.16 Continued employment paid off
significantly for those able secure it.' 66 The image of the poor
single mother also improved, from that of the stay-at-home
"welfare queen" to that a struggling working parent. Tonya
Brito characterizes the change as one from "Madonna to
proletariat," and calls for recognition of the "second shift" as
these full time employees also assumed responsibility for
single parent home care. 167  The most effective anti-poverty
initiatives have correspondingly shifted to medical care, child
care, the Earned Income Tax Credit, family leave, and other
workplace initiatives. 68 To garner support, they require
identification with the refurbished identity of the working
mom and involved dad as the heroes of the new family
system. 169
Nonetheless, the Bush administration has continued to
direct more money toward marriage promotion, with its
implicit embrace of more traditional gender roles, rather than
workplace support or benefits to children.170  Judith Koons
while unemployed Latinos have been able to cushion the loss of income to some
degree by living in households with other wage-earners, including intimate
partners, unemployed African-American mothers have been much less able to
do so).
165. Id. at 5. Nonetheless, a significant group of single mothers were worse
off. That group included women who "were more likely to be African American
than white; and... more likely to report a physical health limitation, low work
skills, a learning disability, no car or driver's license, and substance abuse." Id.
at 6.
166. Id. at 23. The authors emphasize, however, that the worst off-
unemployed African-Americans with health problems-fare even more poorly
than they did before the reforms. Id.
167. Tonya Brito, From Madonna To Proletariat: Constructing a New
Ideology of Motherhood in Welfare Discourse, 44 VILL. L. REV. 415, 415 (1999).
168. For a summary of these proposals and a reiteration of welfare reform's
failure to address children's needs, see Peter Edelman, Beyond Welfare Reform:
Economic Justice in the 21st Century, 24 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 475, 481-
82 (2003).
169. See also Brito, supra note 167, at 441-44 (concluding that the absence of
a more-accurate image of poor, single mothers also shortchanges the possibility
for more-effective assistance).
170. President Bush, for example, vetoed a reauthorization and extension of
The State Children's Health Insurance Program (SCHIP), a federal program
that gives funds to states in order to provide health insurance to families with
children who otherwise lack insurance but have incomes too high to qualify for
Medicaid. Posting of Mark Ames, Natl Ass'n of Secondary Sch. Principals Gov't
Relations Mgr., to Principal's Policy Blog, Bush Vetoes Children's Health Bill for
Second Time, http'//www.principalspolicyblog.orgtblog/2007/12/
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explains that:
The prominent conservative view is that single
motherhood and teenage pregnancy, by themselves, are
causes of poverty and dependency. Into the twenty-first-
century, marriage is being proposed as the ideal anti-
poverty program. In fact, the welfare system is seen as a
result of "the collapse of marriage." . . .According to
marriage advocates, over the past forty years there has
been an "extraordinary shift in cultural norms concerning
sex, marriage, and childbearing," including the advent of
birth control, the entry of more women into the labor force,
and the increasing acceptability of cohabitation outside of
wedlock. Widened opportunities for women, including
alternatives to marriage, that were the fruits of the
women's and civil rights movements are constitutive of
this normative shift.
171
This emphasis on traditional values misses the changing
nature of early adulthood. The failure to recognize the role of
age, not just as a matter of teen pregnancy, but of the
maturity necessary to make either partnership or parenthood
more effective, has short-circuited a more realistic debate
about the sources of poverty and their potential alleviation.
B. Abstinence Education: Marshalling Troops for the Wrong
War
If marriage promotion is something of a detour,
pregnancy prevention need not be. The middle class
realization of successful marriages comes in part through
pregnancy postponement. Research demonstrates, moreover,
that women who give birth in their late twenties, even if poor
and unmarried, produce better outcomes for their children
than younger mothers.7 2 Despite these advantages, the
bushvetoes_childrenshealth-b.html (Dec. 18, 2007, 09:35 PST) (discussing
H.R. 3963, 110th Cong. (2007)).
171. Judith E. Koons, Motherhood, Marriage, and Morality: The Pro-
Marriage Moral Discourse of American Welfare Policy, 19 WIS. WOMEN'S L.J. 1,
22-23 (2004); see also Angela Onwuachi-Willig, The Return of the Ring: Welfare
Reform's Marriage Cure as the Revival of Post-Bellum Control, 93 CAL. L. REV.
1647, 1663 (2005).
172. A recent study indicates that age is an independent factor in predicted
children's outcomes even controlling for the mother's circumstances. In a
thirty-year-follow-up study that measured children's well-being in terms of
educational attainment, financial independence between ages twenty-seven and
thirty-three, and childbearing after twenty, researchers found that mothers
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emphasis on marriage promotion has often been coupled with
policies that make earlier birth more likely.
The now dismantled AFDC system, for example, required
that states offer family planning services to welfare
recipients.17 3  Temporary Assistance to Needy Families
(TANF), in contrast, does not.17 4  The Kaiser Family
Foundation, in a fifty state study, found that only six states
reported using TANF funds to provide contraceptive services
to low-income women.17 5  Instead, TANF permitted the
federal government to provide states with funds to promote
abstinence education.17 6  Congress authorized additional
funds through Community-Based Abstinence Education
(CBAE). Overall funding has increased from $10 million in
1997 to $167 million in 2005 to $177 million in 2007.177
Abstinence-only education, however, which preaches
abstinence without providing information about
contraception, has proven ineffective on several levels. First,
there is no evidence that abstinence-only education in fact
promotes abstinence, or produces a decline in either teen or
non-marital births. 7 8  Second, some studies show that
over the age of twenty-five had the best outcomes, teens the worst, after
controlling for other factors. See Hardy et al., supra note 117, at 807-09; see
also John Mirowsky & Catherine E. Ross, Depression, Parenthood, and Age at
First Birth, 54 Soc. SCI. & MED. 1281, 1290 (2002) (finding maternal depression
greater with younger age of first birth, and the least depression in first time
mothers around age thirty).
173. 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(15) (repealed 1996).
174. JODIE LEVIN-EPSTEIN, CTR. FOR LAW & SOC. POL'Y, TWO SIDES OF THE
SAME COIN OR A Toss OF THE COIN?: FAMILY PLANNING SERVICES AND FAMILY
CAP IMPLEMENTATION, 2 (1999), available at
http://www.clasp.org/publications/two sides_of_ the_samecoin.pdf.
175. Jodie Levin-Epstein, Deputy Dir. for the Ctr. For Law and Soc. Pol'y,
The Henry J. Kaiser Family Found., Welfare, Women, and Health: The Role of
Temporary Assistance for Needy Families, ISSUE BRIEF: AN UPDATE ON
WOMEN'S HEALTH POL'Y, Apr. 2003, at 7, available at
http://www.clasp.orglpublications/womenTANF.pdf. The lack of more-effective
access to contraception may have contributed to an increase in abortions by poor
women. Rebekah J. Smith, Family Caps in Welfare Reform" Their Coercive
Effects and Damaging Consequences, 29 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 151, 176-80
(2006).
176. 42 U.S.C.S. § 710 (LexisNexis 2000).
177. CARMEN SOLOMON-FEARS, CONG. RES. SERV. REP., REDUCING TEEN
PREGNANCY: ADOLESCENT FAMILY LIFE AND ABSTINENCE EDUCATION
PROGRAMS 25 (2005).
178. CHRISTOPHER TRENHOLM ET AL., MATHEMATICA POLY RES., INC., FINAL
REPORT: IMPACTS OF FOUR TITLE V, SECTION 510 ABSTINENCE EDUCATION
PROGRAMS xvii fig.1 (2007), available at http'J/www.mathematica-
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abstinence-only education leaves teens less prepared for the
sexual relations they later develop, with a corresponding
increase in unplanned pregnancies and sexually transmitted
diseases." 9 Finally, an emphasis on abstinence, if effective, is
likely to be associated with younger marriages, 180 which in
turn are more likely to end in divorce.' The result of a focus
on abstinence education is accordingly more likely to be
reinforcement of an ideological position than deterrence of
early or improvident childbearing. Such programs then
mpr.com/publications/PDFs/ impactabstinence.pdf (finding that four to six years
later, participants in abstinence programs were no more likely to avoid
intercourse than the control group not enrolled in the program, and virtually no
differences existed between the age of first sexual intercourse and the rate of
unprotected sex for those who had received abstinence education compared to
those in the control group); John S. Santelli et al., Explaining Recent Declines in
Adolescent Pregnancy in the United States: The Contribution of Abstinence and
Increased Contraceptive Use, 97 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 150, 152-54 (2007)
(discussing that comprehensive sex education programs are more effective at
reducing pregnancies and sexually transmitted diseases), available at
http://opr.princeton.edu/seminars/
papers%5CRecent declinesinadolpregnancyNSFG.pdf; see also Hazel Beh &
Milton Diamond, Children and Education: The Failure of Abstinence-Only
Education: Minors Have a Right to Honest Talk About Sex, 15 COLUM. J.
GENDER & L. 12, 38-42 (2006) (summarizing reviews of the programs'
effectiveness); Hannah Bruckner & Peter Bearman, After the Promise: The STD
Consequences of Adolescent Virginity Pledges, 36 J. ADOLESCENT HEALTH 271,
273-74 (2005). Heritage Foundation scholars, however, have criticized the
findings of some of these studies. See Robert Rector & Kirk A. Johnson,
Heritage Found., Adolescent Virginity Pledges and Risky Sexual Behaviors
(Paper presented at The Eighth Annual National Welfare Research and
Evaluation Conference of the Administration for Children and Families, U.S.
Dep't of Health and Hum. Servs., June 14, 2005),
http://www.heritage.org/research/welfare/upload/9314-l.pdf.
179. Douglas Kirby et al., The Impact of Postponing Sexual Involvement
Curriculum Among Youths in California, 29 FAM. PLAN. PERSP. 100, 105,
http://www.guttmacher.org/pubs/journals/2910097.pdf (concluding that
California program did not prevent sexual activity but did increase pregnancy
rates of participants); Bruckner & Bearman, supra note 178, at 273-77; see also
Santelli et al., supra note 178, at 152-54 (finding that comprehensive sex
education programs are more effective at reducing pregnancies and sexually
transmitted diseases).
180. For a thoughtful examination of this issue, see Barbara DaFoe
Whitehead, Trends Shaping Youthful Sexuality,
http://www.nplc.org/commonground/papers/ whiteheadpaper.htm (last visited
Mar. 21, 2008) (emphasizing the untenability of abstinence in a world in which
the average wait between the beginning of sexual experience and marriage has
grown to eight years for women and ten for men. For African-Americans, the
wait is twelve years for women and nineteen for men).
181. Amato & Rogers, supra note 138, at 621; Booth & Edwards, supra note
138, at 71.
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disproportionately disadvantage low-income women, who are
more likely to be dependent on school and public services for
information and support. A study during the Clinton years
indicated that by 2000 the number of young black and
Hispanic women receiving abstinence-only instruction in lieu
of other forms of sex education had significantly increased,
and exceeded the portion of white women receiving such
instruction. In addition, young women living below 200% of
the poverty level were more likely to receive abstinence-only
instruction (or no sex education at all) than higher-income
women. Two-thirds of white women had received instruction
about contraception prior to their first sexual encounter,
compared with fewer than half of their black peers. 8 2 The
population most at risk of unintended pregnancies and
sexually transmitted diseases is thus offered the least
preparation and assistance.
C. Access to Contraception and Abortion: The Battleground
That Matters
Both proponents of abstinence-only education and those
who prefer comprehensive sex education recognize that such
instruction cannot be effective in isolation. Proponents, who
wish to emphasize individual moral responsibility, see the
transition to adulthood as one that moves from abstinence to
adult roles through courtship and marriage.1 8 3 The abstinent
must be convinced to "save" themselves for the marital roles
that provide the exclusive pathway to family life. Those who
favor comprehensive sex education, in contrast, view
sexuality in terms of autonomy and choice, and identify
responsibility with effective contraception rather than
purity. 184
182. Laura Duberstein Lindberg, John S. Santelli & Susheela Singh,
Changes in Formal Sex Education: 1995-2002, 38 PERSP. ON SEXUAL & REPROD.
HEALTH 182, 185-86 (2006), available at
http://www.guttmacher.org/pubs/journals/3818206.html.
183. See LUKER, supra note 153, at 99 (emphasizing that sex for
conservatives is "sacred" while for liberals, it is natural). For a rejection of the
position that lack of access to contraception will deter sexuality, see Carey v.
Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 699 (1977) (holding that statute that
denied teens access to condoms on such grounds did not pass constitutional
muster).
184. Indeed, both liberals and conservatives cite the following passage in
Planned Parenthood v. Casey:
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For the middle class, access to effective contraception is
an important component of the transition to adulthood; for
conservatives, it is a lynchpin in the cultural shift away from
marriage. 185 The net result of this conflict may ultimately be
secure access for the middle class, and declining availability
for those dependent on government services.
The most telling evidences of these shifts come in the
fight over who deserves credit for the drop in teen births in
the nineties, a development both groups applauded. The
conservatives wished to attribute the decline, which included
a reduction in the number of abortions during the same
period, to greater abstinence, the liberals to greater use of
birth control. The liberals appear to have the better case. A
careful study of data from the National Survey of Family
Growth examined the bases for the declining teenage
pregnancy rate from 1995-2002.86 The researchers found: the
rate of sexual intercourse for fifteen to seventeen year-olds
declined by about 17%, while it remained fairly stable for
eighteen to nineteen year olds; the pregnancy risk for fifteen
to seventeen year olds fell by 55%, while it declined by 27%
for eighteen to nineteen year olds; the rate of condom use by
fifteen to seventeen year olds increased by 20%, from 38% to
58%, while it increased from 34% to 50% for eighteen to
nineteen year olds; and the researchers demonstrated that
14% of the change in pregnancy risk for fifteen to nineteen
year olds was a decline in the number of sexually active
young women, while 86% of the decrease resulted from
changes in contraceptive use.18 7 The overall decline in teen
births was significant, and the decline was greater for
African-Americans than for whites.
Nonetheless, the improvements that came from better
[Iun some critical respects the abortion decision is of the same character
as the decision to use contraception ... for two decades of economic and
social developments, people have organized intimate relationships and
made choices that define their views of themselves and their places in
society, in reliance on the availability of abortion in the event that
contraception should fail.
505 U.S. 833, 853, 856 (1992). See Janet Smith, The Connection Between
Contraception and Abortion, http://www.goodmorals.org/smith4.htm (last
visited Mar. 16, 2008); see also MCCLAIN, supra note 90 (articulating a liberal
feminist view of family values).
185. See Koons, supra note 171, at 22-23.
186. Santelli et al., supra note 178, at 152-54.
187. Id.
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contraceptive use were very much an age and class-based
event, and cost was an important barrier for low-income
women in securing access at all. 8' The Guttmacher Institute
reports that the "unintended pregnancy rate rose 29% among
women living below the poverty level and 26% among women
living between 100% and 200% of the poverty level, but fell
20% among more affluent women."18 9 It increased as well for
high school dropouts, and women between the ages of
nineteen and twenty-four, while declining for adolescents and
college graduates.' 90  In addition, while overall rates of
contraception use increased in the 1990s, the rates have
declined since 2002 due to rising non-use among low-income
women of color.' 91 In 2006, teen pregnancies rose for the first
time since 1991, and the racial group with the largest
increase was black women aged fifteen to nineteen.192
As a result, access to abortion is more critical to
reproductive choice for poorer women and women of color.193
188. THE CTR. FOR REPRODUCTIVE RIGHTS, WOMEN'S REPRODUCTIVE RIGHTS
IN THE UNITED STATES: A SHADOW REPORT 14-15 (Report prepared for the
eighty-seventh session of the Human Rights Committee June 2006), available at
http://www2.ohchr.org/english/ bodies/hrc/docs/ngos/crr.pdf.
189. HEATHER D. BOONSTRA ET AL., ABORTION IN WOMEN'S LIvES 26
(Guttmacher Institute 2006), available at
http://www.guttmacher.org/pubs/2006/05/04/AiWL.pdf.
190. See Lawrence B. Finer & Stanley K. Henshaw, Disparities in Rates of
Unintended Pregnancy in the United States, 1994 and 2001, 38 PERSP. ON
SEXUAL AND REPROD. HEALTH, June 2006, at 89, 93 tbl.1.
191. BOONSTRA ET AL., supra note 189, at 25-26. Racial disparities track the
class divisions. Blacks, Hispanics, and women of other races and ethnicities are
less likely to use contraception than whites. Latinas, for example, are three to
four times more likely than white women to use no method of contraception.
Nat'l Ctr. for Health Stat., Fertility, Family Planning and Reproductive Health
of U.S. Women: Data from the 2002 National Survey of Family Growth, 23
VITAL & HEALTH STAT. Dec. 2005, at 101 tbl.62; see also Rachel K. Jones et al.,
Contraceptive Use Among U.S. Women Having Abortions in 2000-2001, 34
PERSP. ON SEXUAL & REPROD. HEALTH, 294, 295 (2002).
192. Hamilton et al., supra note 146, at 2 (revealing that the pregnancy rate
among adolescents fell 34% between 1991 and 2005 before it reversed in 2006,
rising by 3% among females aged fifteen to nineteen).
193. A 2002 Guttmacher Institute study reported that on the basis of data
collected in seventeen states that between one-third and one-half of all births
were unintended. Rachel K Jones, Jacqueline E. Darroch & Stanley K.
Henshaw, Patterns in the Socioeconomic Characteristics of Women Obtaining
Abortions in 2000-2001, 34 PERSP. ON SEXUAL & REPROD. HEALTH, 226, 229
(2002). Older studies indicate that over 50% of all pregnancies in United States
each year (a total of 3.4 million) are unintended and that failed contraceptives
account for 43% of those unintended pregnancies. Rebekah J. Smith, Family
Caps In Welfare Reform: Their Coercive Effects And Damaging Consequences, 29
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Rebekah Smith emphasizes that while overall abortion rates
were declining in the nineties,194 the "abortion rate among
poor women increased substantially.... Increasingly, women
obtaining abortions were never-married, low-income, non-
white or Hispanic, and usually the parent of at least one
child."19
A New York Times editorial recently emphasized that:
Almost two-thirds of the decline in the total number of
abortions can be traced to eight jurisdictions with few or
no abortion restrictions-New York, New Jersey,
Massachusetts, Illinois, California, Oregon, Washington
State and the District of Columbia, . .. places . .. that
have shown a commitment to real sex education, largely
departing from the Bush administration's abstinence-only
approach. These jurisdictions also help women avoid
unintended pregnancies by making contraception widely
HARv. J.L. & GENDER 151, 176-77 (2006) (citing RACHEL B. GOLD, ABORTIONS
AND WOMEN'S HEALTH: A TURNING POINT FOR AMERICA? 11 (1990)). The Center
for Reproductive Rights further reports that:
While the overall rate of unintended pregnancy has declined since
1994, disaggregated data by race and ethnicity and income reveals that
it remains very high for poor women of color. The rate for black women
is twice the national average, and two-thirds of pregnancies of black
women are unintended. Latinas have a 75% higher unintended
pregnancy rate than non-Hispanics, and low income Latinas are nearly
twice as likely to have an unintended pregnancy as low-income white
women. In 2006, teen pregnancies rose for the first time since 1991,
and the racial group with the largest increase was black women aged
15-19.
Letter from Nancy Northrup, President, Ctr. for Reproductive Rights, to
Nathalie Prouvez, Secretary, Comm. on the Elimination of Racial
Discrimination (Dec. 19, 2007), available at
http://www.reproductiverights.orgpdf/CERD_12.19.07.pdf (citing Finer &
Henshaw, supra note 190, at 94 (2006)); BOONSTRA ET AL., supra note 189, at
28.
194. The overall abortion rate in 2000 in the United States fell to 21 per 1000
women, a decline of 11% from 1994. Jones, Darroch & Henshaw, supra note
193, at 233.
195. Smith, supra note 175, at 177. Among poor women, defined as those
with incomes below 200% of the poverty line, abortion rates increased between
1994 and 2000 by 25%. Jones, Darroch & Henshaw, supra note 193, at 228
tbl.1. Poor women constituted 30% of all women of reproductive age in the
United States, yet they obtained 57% of the abortions in 2000. Id. at 231.
During this period, white women had the lowest abortion rates (1.3%) while
black women had the highest (4.9%). White women also had lower pregnancy
rates, with only 18% of conceptions ending in abortion. Among blacks, who had
a higher pregnancy rate, 43% of conceptions ended in abortion. Hispanics
terminated pregnancies 25% of the time. Id. at 231-32.
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available. 96
The editorial concluded that "prevention works" 197 and
abortion restrictions primarily hurt poorer women, who
postpone abortion until later in the pregnancy. 198  The
availability of abortion also most critically affects women in
their early twenties, the age group most likely to experience
an unwanted pregnancy and most likely to have an
abortion. 99
The primary impact of the failure to promote
comprehensive family planning is exacerbation of the class
divide in control of women's-and especially young women's-
reproductive choices. A consensus should exist on the
importance of preventing unplanned pregnancies. Yet,
politicization of the abstinence and marriage program efforts
has made the availability of family planning a product of
political geography-a geography that disproportionately
disadvantages poorer parts of the country. 00
196. Editorial, Behind the Abortion Decline, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 26, 2007,
available at
http'/www.nytimes.com/2008/01126/opinion/26sat2.html?_r=1&scp=2&sq=abort
ion+contraception&st=nyt&oref=slogin.
197. Id. The link between contraception and abortion nonetheless remains a
site of political controversy, with social value conservatives maintaining that an
emphasis on abstinence and marriage should correlate with both less
contraception (presumably outside of marriage) and less abortion. Credible
empirical studies, however, draw the opposite conclusion, viz., that increases in
the availability and effectiveness of contraception decrease the abortion rate.
See, e.g., Cicely Marston & John Cleland, Relationships Between Contraception
and Abortion: A Review of the Evidence, 29 INT'L FAM. PLAN. PERSP., Mar. 2003,
at 6. But see Smith, supra note 184 ("[The connection between contraception
and abortion is primarily this: contraception facilitates the kind of relationships
and even the kind of attitudes and moral characters that are likely to lead to
abortion.").
198. Behind the Abortion Decline, supra note 196.
199. Between 1994 and 2001, the rate of unintended pregnancy remained the
same (at 49% of all pregnancies), but "was substantially above average among
women aged 18-24, unmarried (particularly cohabiting) women, low-income
women, women who had not completed high school and minority women." Finer
& Henshaw, supra note 190, at 90.
200. For a comprehensive analysis of state-by-state efforts, see The
Guttmacher Inst., Contraception Counts: Ranking State Efforts, 1 IN BRIEF
(2006), available at http'/www.guttmacher.org/pubs/2006/02/28/IB2006nl.pdf.
The U.S. Supreme Court invalidated a N.Y. law in 1977 that banned condom
sales to those under sixteen, holding that "[s]ince the State may not impose a
blanket prohibition, or even a blanket requirement of parental consent, on the
choice of a minor to terminate her pregnancy, the constitutionality of a blanket
prohibition of the distribution of contraceptives to minors is . . .foreclosed."
Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 694 (1977). The states, however,
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Poorer women's lack of access stems from: a general lack
of access to medical insurance; cutbacks in the Medicaid
program that restrict immigrants' eligibility generally,
disproportionately affecting Latinas, and increasing
documentation requirements that delay or frustrate access
even for those women who are eligible; 2 1 lack of adequate
funding for Title X and other public family planning efforts;
restrictions on federal funding of abortion and related
services; and lack of coverage for reproductive services,
including contraception, in many private health plans.0 2
The failure to fund the federal programs that exist and
the inclusion of welfare-based support efforts in block grants
has effectively left administration of family planning efforts
to the states. Congress established the Title X program in
1970, which provides public funding for family planning and
preventive health screening services. In 1978, Congress
amended Title X to place "a special emphasis on preventing
unwanted pregnancies among sexually active adolescents."2 3
Yet, the most recent head of the family planning office, Susan
Orr, has opposed efforts to expand access to contraception,
and applauded a Bush proposal to cease contraceptive
coverage under health insurance for federal employees that
specifically affects teenagers.2 4  Moreover, Congressional
funding for the Title X program is now 61% less in inflation-
adjusted dollars than in 1980, despite needs that have
escalated with the decimation of other programs.5
have threatened to mount challenges to the continued availability of
contraceptive services without parental consent, and as the constitutional limits
on state restrictions of abortion fall by the wayside, so too may constitutional
protection of minors' right of access to contraception.
201. The Kaiser Family Foundation, for example, documents declining
enrollment in Medicaid family planning services. Guttmacher Inst. & Kaiser
Family Found., Medicaid's Role in Family Planning, WOMEN'S ISSUE BRIEF,
Oct. 2007, at 5 fig.4, available at
httpJ/www.guttmacher.org/pubs/IB-medicaidFP.pdf.
202. On the issue of private insurance coverage, see The Guttmacher Inst.,
Insurance Coverage of Contraceptives, STATE POLICIES IN BRIEF, Mar. 1, 2008,
http://www.guttmacher.org/statecenter/spibs/spib-ICC.pdf.
203. Posting of Heather Corinna to Scarleteen,
http://www.scarleteen.com/blog/heather/
2007/10/19/lowincomeaccesstocontraceptionorrnot0 (Oct. 19, 2007, 16:48
EST) (quoting S. REP. NO. 95-822, at 24 (1978)).
204. Corinna, supra note 203.
205. Rachel Benson Gold, Stronger Together: Medicaid, Title X Bring
Different Strengths to Family Planning Effort, 10 GUTTMACHER POLY REV.,
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Progress in the greater availability of reproductive
services, in contrast, has split along class lines. The number
of private medical insurance programs covering
contraception, for example, increased at the same time as the
cuts in public funding." 6 Similarly, the availability of
emergency contraception such as the "morning after pill"
increased as abortion services available later in a pregnancy
declined." 7
D. Family Leave: The Invisible Front
More effective pathways to adulthood require not just
avoiding early pregnancy, but managing the transition to
meaningful adult roles. The relative success of welfare
reform demonstrates the potential for remaking single
mothers' roles to include workforce participation together
with parenthood. The payoffs have included increased self-
Spring 2007, at 15, available at
http://www.guttmacher.org/pubs/gpr/10/2/gprI00213.pdf (discussing how Title X
clinics are struggling to meet the health needs of the rising numbers of
immigrants ineligible for Medicaid); see also Cynthia Dailard, Challenges
Facing Family Planning Clinics and Title X, GUTTMACHER REP. ON PUB. POL'Y,
April 2001, at 8-10, available at
http://www.guttmacher.org/pubs/tgr/04/2/gr040208.pdf; ADAM SONFIELD ET AL.,
COST PRESSURES ON TITLE X FAMILY PLANNING GRANTEES, FY 2001-2004, at 4
(Guttmacher Inst. 2006), available at
http://www.guttmacher.org/pubs/2006/08/01CPTX.pdf (explaining that Title X
funded clinics reported an average cost increase of 58% from 2001-2004 for
language assistance services to serve non-native English speakers). Overall,
Medicaid finding for family planning has increased, and much of the increase
directed toward contraception has been concentrated in fourteen states.
206. Adam Sonfield & Rachel Benson Gold, New Study Documents Major
Strides in Drive For Contraceptive Coverage, 7 GUTrMACHER REP. ON PUB.
POL'Y, June 2004, at 4, available at
http://www.guttmacher.orgpubs/tgr/07/2/grO/0204.pdf.
207. See BOONSTRA ET AL., supra note 189, at 1 (discussing greater
availability of abortion earlier in the pregnancy as the number of abortion
providers has declined); see also Heather D. Boonstra, The Heart of the Matter:
Public Funding of Abortion for Poor Women in the United States, 10
GUTTMACHER POL'Y REV., Winter 2007, at 15,
http://www.guttmacher.org/pubs/gpr/10/1/gprl00112.pdf ("Research indicates
that women who are economically disadvantaged are delayed at two key stages.
Poor women typically take more time than better-off women to confirm a
suspected pregnancy .... In addition, they take several more days between
making the decision to have an abortion and actually obtaining one. When
asked why they were delayed at this stage, poor women are about twice as
likely as more affluent women (after controlling for other personal
characteristics) to report having difficulties in arranging an abortion, usually
because of the time needed to come up with the money.").
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esteem, greater material resources, and better role models for
children.
The downsides, of course, involve the difficulties of
combining full time employment with care of young children.
These difficulties, which all working mothers face, are
exacerbated for those who cannot take time off to deal with
children's unforeseen needs, including sickness, accidents,
appointments, and homework. The flexibility of the
workplace is another arena that divides along class lines,
exacerbating income and racial inequalities. Moreover, to the
extent that poorer women are more likely than their
privileged counterparts to have children at younger ages and
on their own, the lack of family-friendly workplaces will
disproportionately interfere with younger mothers' entry into
paid employment at all.
Disparities in family leave capture some of the divisions.
Low-income workers are less likely than higher-income
workers to be covered by family leave policies, less likely to be
eligible for family leave, and less likely to receive paid family
leave. °8 Roughly 40% of working parents with incomes below
200% of the federal poverty level have no paid leave at all
(i.e., no paid sick days, vacation, nor personal days).2 09
Among entry-level employees leaving welfare for work, only
17% had paid leave; 75% of all low-wage workers lack sick
leave entirely.210
These disparities make it much more likely that poor
women will leave the workforce because of pregnancy. Ann
O'Leary reports that, "From the 1960s to the 1990s,... access
to maternity leave for working-class women remained nearly
constant, whereas access increased more than fourfold for
professional women." 211 As a result less educated workers
are two-and-a-half times more likely to quit their jobs upon
the birth of their first child than women with a bachelor's
degree or higher (46% compared to 19%), and they are three
times more likely to be fired upon the birth of their child
(6.2% compared to 1.9%).212
208. Ann O'Leary, How Family Leave Laws Left Out Low-Income Workers, 28
BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 1, 8 (2007).
209. Id.
210. Id. at 7.
211. Id. at 6.
212. Id. at 7. O'Leary reports further that:
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Background state laws exacerbate the class differences.
Several states (California, Minnesota, and Washington) have
enacted paid family leave legislation, and a series of others
have considered it. 213  More generally, states vary with
respect to a series of parental leave and maternity benefits
and job protection for both state and private sector
employees. Particularly with respect to the protections
mandated for private employers, the states that require such
protections are wealthier, more liberal and more likely to vote
Democratic.214 The background laws, to the extent they make
it more likely that low income single mothers will find it
difficult to remain employed, complicate socialization into
adult workforce roles.1 5
In March 2005, 54% of workers who made more than $15 per hour had
access to a short-term disability policy, while only 28% of workers
earning less than $15 per hour had access to a short-term disability
policy. Similarly, 46% of workers who made over $15 per hour had
access to long-term disability leave, while only 16% of workers making
less than $15 per hour had access to long-term disability leave. There
are similar disparities in access to paid sick leave and paid holidays.
Eighty-eight percent of workers making more than $15 per hour had
access to paid holidays, and 75% of these workers had access to paid
sick leave. Meanwhile, 68% of workers earning less than $15 per hour
had access to paid holidays, and only 47% had access to paid sick leave.
Id. at 8.
213. Press Release, Debra L. Ness, President, Nat'l Partnership for Women
and Families, Washington State's Paid Family Leave Law a Victory for Working
Families, National Women's Leader Says (May 8, 2007), available at
httpJ/www.nationalpartnership.orgsite/PageServer?pagename=newsroompr
PressRelease_070508; see generally National Conference of State Legislatures,
State Family and Medical Leave Act Laws,
http://www.ncsl.org/programs/employ/fmlachart.htm (last visited Mar. 16,
2008).
214. Id. The analysis included family leave benefits (CA first state to adopt),
medical/maternity leave benefits (CA, HI, NJ, NY, RI), flexible sick days (CT,
HI, WA, WI), at home infant care programs (AHIC) (MN, NM, MT suspended
because of budget shortfall), expanded job protection for employees taking
family leave (ME, MA, MN, OR, VT, DC), expanded job protection for medical
maternity leave (DC, CA, CT, HI, IA, LA, ME, MA, MT, NH, OR, SC, VT, WA),
extended family and medical leave (CA, CT, LA, NJ, OR, RI, TN, WA), state
family leave laws (DC, CA, CT, HI, ME, MN, NJ, OR, RI, VT, WA, WI). Id.
215. I take no position here on the classic arguments that increased employer
mandates will make job creation more expensive and thus result in greater
unemployment. My argument here is only that class-based disparities at a time
of different pathways to adulthood make it more likely that less educated
single-mothers will find it more difficult to get and hold jobs than their better
educated peers who delay child-bearing. I note, however, that the long term
marginalization of these women and their children imposes costs on the greater
society, and that greater support for their inclusion in the workplace would
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E. Missing in Action: Men, Education, and Employment
The information economy has expanded the demand for
women's labor.216 As a result, the transition to adulthood for
women focuses on balancing the demands of the workforce
with the demands of childbearing. The challenge for men is
potentially greater as the new economy has undermined both
the workforce and the family roles for lower income men. The
comparison between men's and women's position in the new
economy is reversing customary roles, especially among the
working class.
Consider education rates. Women are now more likely
than men to graduate from college (21.3% to 17.8%) and high
school (61.5% to 59.8%).217 Employment rates for youths aged
sixteen to twenty-four have reached a historic low, and
earnings for the age group from eighteen to twenty-four were
lower in the late nineties, a time of relative prosperity, than
in the late eighties or early seventies.218 Men's occupational
status in the work place is now lower than women's with 40%
of women aged eighteen to thirty-four holding professional,
technical, or white-collar positions compared to only a quarter
of the men. 219  Both hourly wages and employment figures
have correspondingly decreased for men while increasing for
women. 2 0 Racial inequality has also worsened, with African-
American men born in the sixties faring worse than African-
bring benefits.
216. See Henry S. Farber, Is the Company Man an Anachronism? Trends in
Long Term Employment, 1973-2005, at 12 in THE PRICE OF INDEPENDENCE: THE
ECONOMICS OF EARLY ADULTHOOD (Sheldon Danziger & Cecilia Rouse eds.,
2007), available at
http://www.transad.pop.upenn.edu/downloads/farber%20with%20cover%20sheet
.pdf. Labor force studies show increases in the positions typically held by
women (e.g., clerical and service sector employment) and declines in typically
male positions (e.g., manufacturing jobs). See, e.g., J.J. Dolado, F. Felguerosa &
J.F. Jimeno, Female Employment and Occupational Change in the 1990's, How
is the EU Performing Relative to the U.S.?, 45 EuR. ECON. REV. 875, 882-83
(2001) (employment changes have tended to increase employment in "typical"
female occupations and reduce it in "typical" male occupations).
217. Men exceed women among high school dropouts by 22.4 to 17.1%. The
Network on Transitions to Adulthood, Fast Facts: Work and Education,
http://www.transad.pop.upenn.edu/trends/facts_wa.htm (last visited Mar. 16,
2008).
218. Members of the age group from sixteen to twenty-four were more likely
to be employed part-time, however, than they were in 1973. Id.
219. Id.
220. Id.
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American men born a decade earlier.221 In addition, African-
American women have outpaced African-American men's
educational and employment prospects to an even greater
degree than white women have gained on white men.222
Better educated, more affluent, and more ambitious
Americans spend the years between sixteen and twenty-four
in school, or in temporary positions that add to their later
employability. 223 A high percentage of lower-income men in
this age group, however, are neither in school nor employed
on a regular basis. 224 For the least-advantaged men, prison
has become the single institution most likely to shape the
transition to adulthood.225
Moreover, even for those who secure full time
221. Id.
222. For a comprehensive examination of this issue, see ORLANDO
PATTERSON, RITUALS OF BLOOD: CONSEQUENCES OF SLAVERY IN TWO AMERICAN
CENTURIES (1998). He reports, for example, that by the nineties, not only were
African-American women substantially more likely to graduate from college
than African-American men, but they had also become more likely to acquire a
professional degree. Id. at 18-19 figs. 1.9 & 1.10. Indeed, in examining graduate
degrees in business, law, dentistry and medicine, African-American women
earned more degrees than African-American men in every category, while only
one other group of women (Asian-American women in law) were more likely to
earn a degree than men in the same ethnic group in any category. Id.
223. Of those between the ages of eighteen and thirty-four, 61% have some
college and 19% have college degrees. Children in the top quartile income
category, however, receive at least 70% more in material assistance than those
in the bottom income quartile even though they are only 10-15% more likely to
attend college. Fast Facts: Work and Education, supra note 217.
224. Corcoran & Matsudaira report, for example, that a sizeable percentage
of minority of men in their mid-twenties, particularly African-American men,
were not either in school or the labor market full time. Corcoran & Matsudaira,
supra note 79, at 357. More than 14% of whites and a quarter of African-
American men reported fifty-two weeks or more of non-work between the ages
of twenty-four and twenty-six. Fast Facts: Work and Education, supra note
217.
225. The figures are stunning. Stephen Raphael reports that:
Young men in their early twenties are especially likely to have served
time. Their risk of imprisonment has tripled between 1979 and 2001.
For all racial and ethnic groups, less-educated men are considerably
more likely to be incarcerated than more educated men. However, less-
educated black men have the highest incarceration rates. The author
calculates, using California prison data, that 90% of black male high
school dropouts now aged 45 to 54 have been or are in jail.
Stephen Raphael, Early Incarceration Spells and the Transition to Adulthood,
in THE PRICE OF INDEPENDENCE: THE ECONOMICS OF EARLY ADULTHOOD, supra
note 216 (demonstrating that incarceration delays or derails more conventional
aspects of that transition such as employment, education, marriage, and living
independently).
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employment, the rate of employment turnover has increased
in the economy as a whole, making the ability to acquire new
skills, seek new employment, and manage the period in-
between jobs more critical for every social class. Henry
Farber, for example, finds that "[bly virtually any measure,
more recent cohorts of workers have been with their current
employers for less time at specific ages. 226 He concludes the
drop in long-term employment for men has been dramatic.227
Comprehensive consideration of the life paths of young
men in their late teens and early twenties should consider the
affordability of higher education, the process of job related
skill acquisition and training, and the role of institutions such
as the military and universal service. Perhaps, as critically,
there should be reconsideration of the widespread use of
imprisonment, given its counterproductive consequences, for
relatively minor offenses. One of the most telling aspects of
the change in pathways to adulthood is the greater
importance of parental resources in subsidizing and
cushioning the more complex entry of young men into the
labor force.228 The lack of resources for those whose parents
cannot assist increases the number of young men who fall by
the wayside, aggravating in turn the prospects for family
formation by the young women with whom they become
involved. The best hope for their children is a strategy that
increases the resources available for investment in the next
generation.
IV. 25: THE AGE OF AUTONOMY?
Consideration of the growing scientific understanding of
brain development need not, in itself, dictate any particular
laws or policies. Instead, it enriches and informs our
understanding of the effect of societal changes on different
groups at different ages. This article has attempted to
integrate the neuroscience evidence that establishes early
adulthood as a distinct period of human development with the
social science literature on class-based differences in the
226. Farber, supra note 216, at 2.
227. Id. at 23.
228. For a comprehensive examination of this issue, see Lisa Bell et al.,
Failure to Launch: Cross-National Trends in the Transition to Economic
Independence, in THE PRICE OF INDEPENDENCE: THE ECONOMICS OF EARLY
ADULTHOOD, supra note 216.
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pathways to adulthood. The article demonstrates, in
particular, that family formation for different socioeconomic
and racial groups falls on different sides of the age of
maturity, and this in turn exacerbates class-based
vulnerabilities that contribute to growing inequality in the
United States. It ends with a final question that unites the
two parts of that analysis: if fully independent decision-
making is unlikely before the mid-twenties, what is the best
way to guide the transition through the years likely to shape
adult prospects and potential? The middle class answer is to
defer critical life choices until after the effective age of
autonomy, but then to permit much greater tolerance and
corresponding less institutional support for the results.12
9
That model, at a time of declining public and private support
for those ready to begin adulthood in their early twenties, has
been disastrous for those who lack access to middle class
resources.
In understanding these developments and the possible
responses to them, two particular areas deserve special
consideration. First, this article suggests heightened
attention to the political developments that have frustrated
more effective policy responses. All groups have been affected
by the combination of the changing economy, and men's and
women's roles within it. Nonetheless, while the secular
middle class has effectively adapted in ways that enhance the
class position and material advantages of college educated
women and their offspring, these changes have been
particularly threatening to traditionalists who continue to
condemn non-marital, sexuality as "sinful" and celebrate
marriage as a sacred institution designed to unite sexuality,
reproduction and child-bearing. 230  For this group, the
increases in divorce and non-marital childbirth have
provoked a sense of crisis, one heightened by the generational
divisions between the deeply religious and their young adult
children.231  These views, though, are not shared by the
229. The critical support middle class parents provide, of course, is assistance
in reaching the age of autonomy. For thirty-somethings entering marriage and
having children, parental guidance takes on an entirely different meaning than
it does for a twenty-year-old.
230. See LUKER, supra note 153, at 154-55.
231. For more comprehensive examination of these developments, see
Barbara Dafoe Whitehead, The Changing Pathway to Marriage: Trends in
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majority of Americans. A Gallup poll indicates that 55% of all
Americans, and 75% of those between eighteen and twenty-
nine agree that "premarital sex is not wrong."232 Nonetheless,
as the debates over welfare reform, abstinence education,
contraception and abortion illustrate, an activist minority has
succeeded in using the political process to undercut
assistance for the most vulnerable Americans. The results
are particularly cynical. The middle class, which has the
political clout to defeat more radical changes, has been
largely unaffected by the lesser support for access to birth
control and abortion.233  Wholesale cutbacks and their
disproportionate impact on low-income women remain
virtually invisible to much of the electorate. Conservatives
can accordingly satisfy their fundamentalist "base" without
paying a political price among moderates. In the process,
however, the state has used the language of "moral values" to
implement policies that reinforce the moral commitments of
some groups at the expense of attention to the needs and
circumstances of lower-income Americans.
The second issue involves reconsideration of the basis for
protection of class interests within modern democracies. The
Carolene Products234 footnote, often heralded as the clarion
call of the post-War War II enforcement of civil rights,
established the courts as the watchdogs guarding over
measures that disadvantaged "insular minorities" and other
unpopular groups.235 Today, that part of the judicial role has
Dating, First Unions, and Marriage among Young Adults, in FAMILY
TRANSFORMED: RELIGION, VALUES, AND SOCIETY IN AMERICAN LIFE 168
(Steven M. Tipton & John Witte Jr. eds., 2005).
232. Frank Newport, Editor-in-Chief, The Gallop Poll, Gallup Poll Review
From The Poll Editors: Sexual Norms: Where Does America Stand Today? THE
GALLUP POLL, Dec. 1997, http://www.hi-ho.ne.jp/taku77/refer/sexnorm.htm.
Moreover, 2002 data indicate that by age twenty, 77% of respondents had had
sex, and 75% had premarital sex. By age forty-four, 95% of respondents (94%
of women, 96% of men, and 97% of those who had ever had sex) had had
premarital sex. Even among those who abstained until at least age twenty, 81%
had had premarital sex by age forty-four. Finer concludes that "[ailmost all
Americans have sex before marrying." Lawrence B. Finer, Trends in Premarital
Sex in the United States, 1954-2003, 122 PUB. HEALTH REP. 73, 76 (2007).
233. See supra text accompanying notes 184-207 (indicating that the middle
class has become more likely to rely on contraception than abortion, while
poorer women have become more dependent on abortion as access to
contraception has become more difficult).
234. United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 fn.4 (1938).
235. Id.
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been challenged both from the right, which rejects the
substance of such rights-based protection, and the left, which
distrusts the capability of the judiciary to command support
for broad-based rulings such as Roe v. Wade.2 36
Simple rights analysis, of the type that affirmed women's
rights to access to contraception and abortion,2 37 accordingly
holds little promise. Two developments, in particular,
hamstring a more active judicial role on these issues. The
first is the move in the United States toward recognition only
of those rights that limit government power (negative rights
or liberties), rather than positive rights that compel
government action.238 In the context of reproductive liberty,
this distinction has served to reinforce the class-based nature
of access to contraception and abortion. David Garrow
emphasizes that this division was true both before and after
the Supreme Court's decision in Roe.239
The second is the challenge to the judicial authority to
compel consensus-based support for social action. Legal
scholars have questioned both the propriety of judicial
leadership on policy issues240 and queried whether decisions
too far ahead of popular consensus simply provoke backlash
that undermines the authority of the courts.24'
236. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). For a summary of these
developments, see Robert Post & Reva Siegel, Roe Rage: Democratic
Constitutionalism and Backlash, 42 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 373 (2007).
237. See, e.g., id. at 373; Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965).
238. For the original articulation of the distinction, see ISAIAH BERLIN, TWO
CONCEPTS OF LIBERTY, reprinted in ISAIAH BERLIN, FOUR ESSAYS ON LIBERTY
118 (Henry Hardy ed., Oxford Univ. Press 1996) (1958). For a more recent
defense of positive constitutionalism, see generally SOTIRIOS A. BARBER,
WELFARE AND THE CONSTITUTION (2003). This article, however, takes no
position on the wisdom of positive rights claims, such as those which might
recognize an enforceable right to funding necessary to realize contraception or
abortion. See, e.g., the cases upholding the Hyde Amendment's refusal to fund
abortions for poor women, Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977); Harris v. McRae,
448 U.S. 297 (1980).
239. See David J. Garrow, Abortion Before and After Roe v. Wade: An
Historical Perspective, 62 ALB. L. REV. 833, 834 (1999) (emphasizing that
middle-class women with resources and contacts had ready access to abortion
before Roe, while poorer women did not); DAVID J. GARROW, LIBERTY AND
SEXUALITY: THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY AND THE MAKING OF ROE V. WADE 418-21
(Univ. of Cal. Press 1998) (1994).
240. For reservations about the judicial role, see, e.g., CASS R. SUNSTEIN,
ONE CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON THE SUPREME COURT 54 (1999).
241. See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr., Pluralism and Distrust: How Courts
Can Support Democracy by Lowering the Stakes of Politics, 114 YALE L.J. 1279,
AGE MATTERS
This article maintains that, in the context of class-based
changes in family formation, the primary problem is not the
ability to enforce any particular right, however much greater
access to contraception, for example, might help. Instead, the
problem lies in the lack of access to the agenda creating
mechanisms for the assertion of moral authority. Recreating
support for the transition to adulthood cannot occur so long as
the source of the problem is invisible. Tonya Brito comes close
to capturing this sense of powerless when she maintains that
the lack of compelling symbolism has made it "difficult to win
broad-based political support for progressive welfare reform
proposals, including universal programs that aim to benefit
all low-income families."242 I have argued elsewhere that the
culture wars at the core of the dispute over sexuality are so
intense because they involve struggle over the articulation of
the ideal to govern socialization of the next generation.243
The question then becomes how do we express "the
values that concern us and bind us together," 244 and most
critically, how do we do so in the face of deep divisions about
what those values are? We certainly cannot do so if the
representatives of the groups most deeply affected are not
included in the process. Welfare reform provides a telling
example of legislative reform, with far ranging effects, in
which only one side in the culture war-the marriage
proponents-meaningfully participated in shaping the
symbolism of the venture, and the group most directly
affected lacked even a surrogate voice in the process.
1326 (2005).
242. Brito, supra note 167, at 416.
243. See June Carbone, Autonomy to Choose What Constitutes Family:
Oxymoron or Basic Right?, in AUTONOMY IN THE LAW 22 (Mortimer Sellers ed.,
2007).
244. Robert Nozick, a libertarian advocate of a minimalist state, came to the
conclusion that:
Within the operations of democratic institutions, too, we want
expressions of the values that concern us and bind us together. The
libertarian position I once propounded now seems to me seriously
inadequate, in part because it did not fully knit the humane
considerations and joint cooperative activities it left room for more
closely into its fabric. It neglected the symbolic importance of an official
political concern with issues or problems, as a way of marking their
importance or urgency, and hence of expressing, intensifying,
channeling, encouraging, and validating our private actions and
concerns toward them.
ROBERT NOZICK, THE EXAMINED LIFE 286-87 (1989).
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Instead, the challenge must center on how to make the
values of the information economy more universal. Those
values place a primary emphasis on the exercise of autonomy
made possible by the postponement of critical life choices
until after the age of full emotional maturity. The middle
class achieves that autonomy by investment in the education
and independence of its offspring. College dorms, subsidized
internships, and shared living arrangements provide
guidance in realizing a measure of independence. An array of
friendships permits exploration of the meaning of
companionship and negotiation of the basis for gender roles.
At the same time, more permanent choices of a spouse, a
career, and children occur only after adulthood has been fully
and meaningfully reached.
Historically, training for and realization of autonomy has
been the exclusive preserve of elites. Working-class life has
traditionally involved earlier assumption of adult roles, less
choice, and greater coercion. The institutions that provided
for stable working-class roles in the last half century,
however, including marriage as a universal and the less-
skilled manufacturing jobs of the last economic era, are
largely gone. To the extent then that there is a
transformative potential lurking, it is the role of women.
Women's greater workforce opportunities open the door to
greater autonomy in the selection of mates, and the advent of
birth control and abortion plus protection from sexual
coercion hold open the prospect of greater choice in the timing
and number of children. Realization of that autonomy holds
the key to greater investment in the next generation as a
whole.
958 [Vo1:48
